(On Matthew 12:31)
“This form of speech is a common Hebraism: the Jews often said, this shall be, and that shall not be; not intending however to affirm absolutely that the first should be, but merely to show that the last was much more unlikely or difficult, than the first. The sense, is this: any crime which may be committed, even all calumnies, (or blasphemies,) which hold the first rank among crimes, may be forgiven more readily than the calumny, (or blasphemy,) against the Spirit of God. See a similar comparison, 1 Sam. ii. 25.’ Annot. in. loc.)

(On Matthew 12:43)
“Christ appears to have had reference to the character of the Jewish people, at the two periods of their captivity in Babylon, and their destruction by Titus. Before their captivity, the people were exceedingly wicked, as may be seen in the Prophets ; during their exile many began to reform, and under a superintending Providence, returned to their native land. But in the days of the Asmonaeans, having again plunged into excessive wickedness, they added to their other crimes, a contempt of the Messiah, who came to them with a message of. mercy, and exercising miraculous power. Having done this, they were abandoned by God, and became the most wicked of all men, as Josephus has described them in his history of their last days.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Matthew 24:3)
“Christ, if I am capable of discerning any thing, distinctly answers two distinct questions. – The coming of Christ many do not distinguish from the end of the world, being, I apprehend, deceived by the ambiguity of the word; for it is most certain, that the word parousia [or coming] has a diversity of acceptation. – I here interpret it, not of the Judgment, but of THE KINGDOM of the Messiah.” (Matt. xxiv. 3.)

(On Matthew 24:6-7)
“Christ declares, that greater disturbances than those which happened under Caligula, should fall out in the latter times of Claudius, and in the reign of Nero. That of ‘nation against nation’ portended the divinations, insurrections, and mutual slaughter of the Jews and those of other nations, who dwelt in the same cities together; as particularly at Caesarea,”

(Indicat Christus majores quam sub Caio evenerant caedes imminere ultimis temporibus Claudianis, et Neronis principatu. Illud eqnoj epi eqnoj significat Judaeos et qui aliarum erant gentium iisdem in civitatibus morantes mutuis inter me caedibus collidendos : quod contigit Caesareae primum, [Translated in the text.] deinde Scythopoli, Ptolemaide, Tyri, Gadaris, rursum Alexandriae, deinde et Damasci. [Afterwards at Scythopolis, Ptolemais, Tyre, Gadara, and again at Alexandria.] Illud autem Baseileia epi Basileian significat tretrarcharum ant provinciarum aperta inter me bella — Huc referri debet Judaeorum in Peraea habitantium bellum adversus Philadelphenos ob finium controversiam, Cuspio Fado procuratore; Judaeorum et Galilaeorum bellum adversus Samaritas, procuratore Cumano; postremo bellum primum a sicariis quos vocabant, deinde, ab universa Judaeorum gente sumtum adversus Romanos et Agrippum aliosque Romani imperiiaocios, quod initium habuit Gessio Floro procuratore. [Translated in the text, p. 386.] – Quoted in Newton’s The Prophecy of Matthew 24, Dissertation XVIII)

(On Matthew 25:31)
“This parable of the pounds hath, for the general, the very same scope with that of the talents, Matt. xxv. That nobleman or king, that went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, is Christ in his gospel, going forth to call in the Gentiles to his obedience : returning, he cuts off the nation of the Jews, that would not have him to reign over them, ver. 27 ; and while they were now in expectation of the immediate revelation of the kingdom of heaven, and were dreaming many vain and senseless things concerning it, our Saviour, by his parable, warns and admonisheth them, that he must not look for any advantage by that kingdom, who cannot give a good account of those talents which God had committed to his trust and improvement.” (Heb. and Talm. Exerc. in Luke xix. 13.)

“I saw in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even barbarous nations might blush. Wars were begun on trifling pretexts or none at all, and carried on without any reference of law, Divine or human.” (Prolegomena)

“For God has given conscience a judicial power to be the sovereign guide of human actions, by despising whose admonitions the mind is stupefied into brutal hardness.”

(On John 8:21)
“The destruction of the city and people is indicated, which was a presage of the general judgment.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Acts 3:19)
“Times of refreshing: as calamities are compared to heat, so deliverance from them is compared to refreshing breezes. The sense is this : repent, that ye may be exempted from the impending destruction of this nation.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Acts 13:46)
“Beware lest that happen to you which your fathers experienced — your city and temple being destroyed, and yourselves carried into captivity, on account of your contemning the blessings of God.” (Annot. in loc)

(On Romans 6:21)
“Although what is here said may properly apply to the punishments of another life, yet God chooses more speedily to manifest, in a signal manner, his severity against the contumacious : against the Eomans, by subjecting them to the worst species of tyranny, and to bloody civil wars ; and against the Jews, by utterly casting them out from their native land, and abolishing their political and ecclesiastical privileges.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Romans 9:22)
“Willing to show his severity and power against the impious Jews, in the judgments executed by the Romans ; for the apostle here intends the desolation predicted by Daniel and by Christ.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On 2 Thessalonians 2:3)
“The apostle means that Caius, as he was exceedingly wicked, was destined by the Lord to a signal destruction, than which nothing could be more true.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On 2 Peter 2:12)
“They shall perish in the same manner as those animals who, by nature, are destined to be taken and slain by men. He predicts the issue of the war excited by Barchocheba. Similar comparisons occur, Jer. x. 18 ; Ps. cxli. 10; Hab. i. 15. This is said to be their justly merited fate, because they reviled those things which they understood not; for they did not realize the utility of a government. In their own corruption : that is, .when the time of their destruction should come.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Jude 14)
“Whatever Enoch said, or was able to say, on the approach of the deluge, might very fitly be referred, by Judo, to that almost universal slaughter which menaced the contumacious Jews.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Revelation 14:9-11)
“Shall be tormented with fire and brimstone : these words may, indeed, very aptly signify torments after the resurrection. But as similar language occurs, chapter xix. 10, where no reference is had to that period, as is evident from what follows, it appears that an interpretation should here also be adopted, applicable to that people ; —that conscience should be understood as burning within them, in the presence of Christ and his angels : this would be somewhat like dwelling in gehenna. Thus have the poets represented the bosoms of men to be burned before the faces of the furies. ‘ And the smoke of their torment ascendeth, &c. : the memory of the afflictions they have suffered shall continually remain. Words often burst forth from the mpious, testifying the anguish of their minds; as from Tiberius, in his epistle, found ia Tacitus, and Suetonius.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Revelation 17:8-11)
“Go into perdition: perdition here, as in John xvii. 12, and 2 Thess. ii. 3, signifies, not simply death, but a most grievous death ; such occurred in the case of Domitian, who was slain by the hands of his own servants, as may be seen in Suetonius and Philostratus.” (Annot. in loc.)

(On Revelation 21:18-19)
“Enter in through the gates into the city: such were they who lived in the days of Constantine, and afterwards; they were permitted to witness the splendor of the church, promised to the ancient fathers, and to be rulers in it. ‘ Without are dogs, &c.: such were those who were either not admitted to baptism, or, if formerly admitted, were afterwards excluded from the church.” (Annot. in loc.)

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Grotius Believed in the First-Century Return Of Christ

Although most famous for his theories of natural law, Grotius was also considered to be a great theologian. While occasionally writing about Christianity and religion, his intention for law was to write of it as independent of religious opinions.

Shortly after his arguments for the liberty of the sea, Grotius became involved in disputes with the Calvinists. Grotius sided against predestination and Calvinism and took up the Arminian cause of free will. He publicly claimed that Calvinist beliefs could have political and religious dangers to Protestantism. Grotius tried to devise a formula for peace that did not go against Calvinism. His attempts failed and ultimately led to his imprisonment. Grotius is partially known for his great escape from the castle of Loevestein in March of 1621.

Grotius talks of similar topics and ideals in both the Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty and in On the Law of War and Peace. The major themes in each of these books are of war, peace, law, and of God. According to Grotius, all law, should be divided into what is divine and what is human. He distinguishes between primary laws of nature and secondary laws of nature. Primary laws of nature are laws that are completely expressed by the will of God. On the contrary, secondary laws of nature are rules and laws that lie within reason. Grotius discusses war as being a mode of protecting rights and punishing wrongs. It is a mode of judicial procedures. Although war was considered a “necessary evil,” it needed to be regulated. The “just war,” in the eyes of Grotius, is a war to obtain a right.

Grotius discusses three methods of which for settling a dispute peacefully. The first is conference and negotiation amongst two rivals or contestants. The second method is called compromise, which is a settlement in which each side gives up some demands or makes concessions. The third is that of single combat or choosing by lot. Grotius believed that it is sometimes better to renounce rights than to try and enforce them. When it comes to bargaining and mediation he highlights that it is of extreme importance to select a judge with character and decency for any of these methods. Grotius discusses these methods of achieving piece to ultimately obtain some form of justice. He says, “For justice brings peace of conscience, while injustice causes torment and anguish… in the breasts tyrants. Justice is approved, and injustice condemned, by the common agreement of good men.” (Prolegomena)

Grotius intended moral laws to apply to both the individual and the state equally. Although Grotius was somewhat conservative in his views, his ideas on war, conquest, and the law of nature continued to be revered and expanded by more liberal philosophers like John Locke in his Two Treatises on Civil Government (1689). Locke agrees with Grotius in using the analytical device that a state of nature exists before civil government and in the general claim that might does not make right as well as the claim that just wars aim to preserve rights.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

“Hugo Grotius was born in Delft in 1583, an exciting time of social, economic, religious and political transformation. The Netherlands had just declared their independence from Spain, and many skilled immigrants were moving from the Spanish-controlled southern Netherlands (present-day Belgium) and elsewhere, primarily for the religious tolerance of the north. The Netherlands were booming economically and demographically, and this was reflected in the flowering intellectual and cultural life.

Grotius’ father Jan was a doctor of laws who became mayor of Delft and later curator of Leiden University, established as the first university in the Netherlands in 1575. Grotius commenced his university studies at Leiden when he was eleven, focussing on classical languages as well as Hebrew and Arabic in addition to mathematics and physics. At the university, Grotius befriended the famous scholar Scaliger, who helped him publish an edition of Martianus Capella’s Satyricon, a rare achievement for a boy not yet fourteen years old. Concluding his university studies, Grotius joined the 1598 embassy to the French court headed by prime minister Oldenbarnevelt. There, he was presented to King Henri IV, who hailed him as the “miracle d’Hollande.” Grotius remained in France for a few months after the conclusion of the embassy, earning the diploma of doctor from the Université d’Orléans. By April 1599, he was back in the Netherlands and, at sixteen years of age, ready to start a professional career. At the end of 1599 he took the oaths as advocate before the courts at The Hague.

The busy legal practice in no way dampened Grotius’ literary activity, and he published a number of his own Latin poems as well as some translations. With a grant from the States of Holland and the States-General, Grotius wrote De Antiquitate Reipublicæ Batavicae, a history of the origins of the Dutch Republic and, in the autumn of 1604, became historiographer of Holland.³ He was also busy with a comparative study of constitutions and, in 1607 (at the age of 24!) was appointed to be Advocate-Fiscal of Holland, a position which included the functions of Attorney-General, Public Prosecutor and Sheriff. Some time earlier, Grotius had also become employed by the Dutch East India Company as its advocate.⁴

The chief event on which Grotius was asked to justify the Company’s position was the seizure by one of the Company’s admirals, Jacob van Heemskerk, of the Portuguese ship ‘Catharina’ in the straits of Malacca. He engrossed himself in the study of the matter of prize and, by 1606, had completed a book on the subject. The book was not published until the 19th century, however, though a single chapter of the book was distributed as the essay Mare Liberum, on the freedom of the seas.

In 1608, a few months after Grotius was named Advocate-Fiscal of Holland, he married nineteen-year-old Maria van Reigersberch, who came from a prominent Zeeland family. During the next few years, Grotius maintained his high level of activity, writing literary works as well as legal tracts and becoming ever more heavily involved in politics. In 1613, he was part of a mission to England which centred on discussions relating to freedom of navigation and commerce in the Indian seas. The English were claiming the same freedom from the Dutch as the Dutch had claimed a few years earlier from the Spanish and Portuguese. A second, more delicate, aim of the mission was for Grotius to apprise King James I of the ecclesiastical situation in the Netherlands and to encourage him to take a position favourable to the States of Holland.

Both missions seem to have been generally unsuccessful. Before leaving for England, however, Grotius had already accepted the office of Pensionary of the city of Rotterdam, and he applied himself to this new challenge. Nominally the servant of the town council, the Pensionary often actually directed its policy. Since Rotterdam was the second-most influential city in the Netherlands, the thirty-year-old Grotius’ new office guaranteed him a prominent role in Dutch politics. The position included a place in the executive council of the Province and in the States-General, and the holder of the office could not fail to play an active part in the controversies which were dividing state and nation.

The controversies concerned, on the surface, a difference of opinion between conservative and liberal Calvinists about predestination. Rotterdam was the only city in the Netherlands in which the liberals had a majority and, during the course of the summer of 1613, Grotius published Ordinum pietas, defending the leadership of the province of Holland against the aspersions of conservative preacher Sibrandus Lubbertus. Lubbertus responded with a pointed attack entitled Responsio ad Pietatem Hugonis Grotii, which the liberals condemned as a scandalous libel. The province of Holland favoured moderation and, early in 1614, passed a resolution (drafted by Grotius) calling for greater liberty of discussion in the universities, while conceding that the clergy were to avoid teaching anything outside the prescribed limits. The resolution, which attempted to find common ground between the two positions, reflected Grotius’ earlier attempts to bring together Gomar (leader of the conservatives) and Arminius (leader of the liberals).

The resolution had little effect, however, and the conflict rapidly evolved into much more than a simple difference of opinion about an obscure theological point. It became intertwined with the political question of the relative power of the provinces and the States-General within the Dutch federation. The “controversy between Arminius and Gomar, spreading from the university to the pulpit, and from the pulpit to the street and the tavern convulsed the United Provinces with a fury of contending animosities. The political issue and the religious issue became inextricably mixed, and the pivotal point of each was the Province of Holland.”⁵ Holland was the most powerful province in the federation, and also the only one in which the liberals were in the majority. Prince Maurits, with his strong centralising aspirations, saw in the religious issue a chance to focus the anger felt over Holland’s predominance towards his political gain. Thus the ecclesiastical dispute fed and was in turn subsumed by the political struggle between the smaller provinces and Holland.

Something akin to a ‘civil cold war’ started around July 1617 when the conservative Calvinists, excluded by decree from using State churches, invaded the Cloister Church in The Hague and established themselves in possession. Prince Maurits attended their service two weeks later, sending a clear signal. Caught up in his dispassionate legal analysis, however, Grotius failed to see the political reality of the situation. Towards the end of June 1618, against the protestations of the province of Holland, the States-General issued a summons to the various provinces to attend a national synod to decide the religious question. A flurry of negotiations followed (Grotius, characteristically, was right in the middle of things), culminating in a secret resolution of the States-General (clearly illegal, as far as Grotius’ dispassionate legal analysis went) authorising Prince Maurits and others “to take any measures which they might judge necessary in the public interest. This was followed one day later [on August 29, 1618] by another secret resolution ordering the arrest of Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and Hogerbeets, the Pensionary of Leiden.”⁶ Oldenbarnevelt was executed, while Grotius and Hogerbeets were imprisoned.

Thus, at the age of 36, Grotius was arrested and imprisoned in the castle of Loevestein on no substantive charge other than being on the losing political side. His meteoric rise to fame and glory was over. Having much free time, and reading books sent by his friends from Leiden, he produced a large number of new literary works including Annotations on the Gospels, part of his Commentary on the New Testament. In Dutch, he produced Bewys van den Waren Godtsdienst, a Proof of the True Religion designed primarily as a handbook for Dutch seafarers travelling in non-Christian countries. He also composed a legal tome, the Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd (Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland), which became the foundation of Dutch law until replaced by Napoleonic code in 1809. 7

Two years after his imprisonment Grotius succeeded in a fabled escape planned by his wife, in which he was placed in a chest which was purportedly filled with books. Via Antwerp, he fled to Paris with his brother Willem, where he was joined after five months by his wife and elder children. From 1621 to 1631, Grotius fostered the hope of an honourable return to the Netherlands. In 1623, he began writing De Jure Belli ac Pacis. As the years went on, Grotius devoted more and more of his time to the study of theology. In 1631, he returned to Holland for a few months, but was forced to flee to Hamburg, returning to Paris in 1635 as ambassador of the young Queen Christina of Sweden. As ambassador, Grotius’ time was filled with negotiations and visits. In 1637, he entertained the young John Milton, who was passing through Paris. Grotius maintained his ambassadorial post in Paris until a few months before his death ten years later.” (British Academy’s Annual Lecture on a Master Mind: R.W. Lee. Hugo Grotius (London: Proceedings of the British Academy, 1930).

Grotius’ conception of the nature of natural law is set forth in his works De Jure Praedae (Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty) and De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace). On the Law of War and Peace, which was published in 1625, is a seemingly expanded version of On the Law of Prize and Booty, which was written in the late months of 1604 and the early months of 1605. On the Law of Prize and Booty was not published until 1868 when it was discovered at a book sale by several professors from the University of Leyden. Although this manuscript was not found until the late 19th century, Chapter Twelve of the book was published separately in 1609 as Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas). Mare Liberum talks about the rights of England, Spain, and Portugal to rule over the sea. Grotius argued that the liberty of the sea was a key aspect in the communications amongst people and nations. No one country can monopolize control over the ocean because of its immensity and lack of stability and fixed limits.

Time Line

1583	April 10, born Easter Day in Delft, Holland. Son of Jan de Groot, a Curator at the University of Leyden.
1591	Started composing Latin verse (age 8).
1594	August 3, begins studying at the University of Leyden (age 11).
1598	May 5, receives his Doctorate at the University of Orleans while accompanying Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (Lawyer & Prime Minister of the United Netherlands) on a diplomatic mission to France. Grotius was greeted by King Henry IV as “the miracle of Holland.”
1599	December 13, admitted to the bar in Holland. Practiced law at The Hague.
1601	1601 Becomes Latin histographer of Holland. Practices law with the Dutch East India Merchants and Johan van Oldenbarnevelt.
1604	Becomes legal council for Prince Mauritus van Nassau. Wrote De Jure Praedae (On the Law of Prize) in the last months of 1604 and the first months of 1605.
1607	Appointed Attorney General and First Public Comptroller for the courts of Holland, Zealand, and West Friesland.
1608	July 17, marries Maire van Reigersberch (eventually has four sons and three daughters).
1613	March 4, promoted to Governor of Rotterdam. This carried with it a seat in the States Attorney General of Holland and the States General of the United Netherlands.
1617	Becomes a member of the Committee of Counselors under the Arminian Party. August 3, conflict arises with the “Sharp Revolution” (Scherpe Resolutie; signed by van Oldenbarnevel) between the States General (Arminians) and Holland (soon to be Calvinist).
1618	August 29, unexpected Calvinist coup d’etat. Grotius, van Oldenbarnevelt, and Rombout Hoogerbeets (Pensionary of Leyden) are arrested on behalf of the new States General.
1619	May 13, special Tribunal of 24 judges meet to try the three political prisoners. Van Oldenbarnevelt is sentenced to death. May 18, Grotius and Hoogerbeets are sentenced to life in prison at the castle of Loevestein. At this point the has been no declaration of charges. June 6, Grotius begins serving his prison sentence at Loevestein.
1620	June 6, supplemental judgement declares the charges of Grotius to be treason (laesa majestas).
1621	March 22, with the help of his wife, Grotius escapes to Antwerp and later to Paris.
1625	De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace) is published in Paris. This later distinguishes him as the “Father of International Law”.
1631	After remaining in exile in Paris, Grotius returns to Holland in defiance of his status. He practices law in Amsterdam and is offered the Governor Generalship of the Dutch East Indies Company in Asia.
1632	March, a 2000 guilder price is put on the head of Grotius. April 17, flees Holland for Hamburg, Germany. He spends three years in Germany.
1634	Appointed Ambassador of Sweden to France in Paris by Count Axel Oxenstierna.
1635	Begins his diplomatic duties in Paris. Helps negotiate a treaty for ending the Thirty Years War.
1644	December 30, Grotius is relieved form the position of Ambassador in Paris. He received a letter of recall from Queen Christina.
1645	March, takes family and leaves for Stockholm, Sweden to take on another position. He gets shipwrecked after sailing across the Baltic Sea. August 13, sails for Lubeck but has to land eight days later because of severe storms. August 28, dies in Rostock, Germany from exhaustion. The final words of Grotius were, “By understanding many things, I have accomplished nothing.”

 

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Richard Baxter (1615-1691)
“I must in Gratitude profess that I have learnt more from Grotius then from almost any Writer that ever I read.” (Calendar I, no. 234 n.1)

J.P. Dabney (1829)
Matthew 10 “23. Till the Son of man be come : Le Clerc supposes that this coming, in the present instance, can only well be referred to the destruction of the Jewish state and of Jerusalem ; and so also Whitby. Grotius would understand it of the full effusion of the Holy Spirit at the day of Pentecost ; while Priestley, less naturally and probably than either, applies it to Christ’s second coming, to raise the dead and judge the world. For this explication, he assigns no reasons.” (Annotations on the New Testament: compiled from the best critical authorities, p. 18)

Matthew 16: “28. Coming to his kingdom : so Wakefield. ” Or, — coming to reign, meaning probably till they shall see the Christian religion established in the world.” Mss. Notes. See Note on Ch. x. 7- This coming of Christ, however, is very variously understood. Hammond refers it to the great destruction of Jerusalem (as in Matt. xxiv. 3) ; Whitby, to the last day, from the similarity of the language used, to that of Matt. xxv. 31; 2 Thes. i. 7 ; Matt. xiii. 41. Grotius supposes it to signify the first manifestation of Christ’s power, by his resurrection, ascension, and sending the Holy Spirit, which our Lord declares would speedily take place. It is the common opinion of critics, that in the minds of the disciples, the destruction of the Jewish state and the final judgment were frequently conjoined, from the near resemblance in the language used by our Saviour, in respect to both. ” (ibid, p. 28)

Philip Doddridge
“Grotius has done more to illustrate the Scriptures, by what is generally called profane learning, than perhaps almost all the other commentators put together ; nevertheless, he too often gives up prophecies, which, in their original sense, relate to the Messiah  His notes on some texts are large and learned dissertations, which might have profitably been published by themselves.”  (Lectures on Preaching, 5th vol, p. 471)

Robert Fleming
“After I had finished the foregoing discourse [i.e., “Apocalyptical Key” (1701)] and that all the sheets were almost printed, I was earnestly urged by a friend to say something to secure the foundation I go upon: especially because the learning of Grotius and Dr. Hammond had influenced many to follow another way of interpreting the Revelation, as the reputation of Mr. Baxter had swayed others to think well of the same. And when I urged that Dr. More, in his Mystery of Iniquity, and Dr. Cressener, in his Demonstration of the First Principles of the Protestant Interpretations of the Apocalypse, had done this sufficiently already; he replied, that these books were both voluminous and dark, and not easy to be purchased by every one; and that, therefore, some short account of this matter at this time seemed to be necessary. I urged many things against this, as, hat this advice came too late and that, should I contract never so much, it would swell this part of my book too much to keep a due proportion with the other discourses; and, indeed, make the whole too bulky. But after all, importunity; and the respect I bore my friend, prevailed with me to say something to all those things that he thought I ought to premise. Therefore, not to spend any longer time in giving the reasons why I did not speak to these things before in their proper place, or why I do so now, I shall give my thoughts of this book, and the first principles of the right interpretation of it, in some propositions, which do gradually lay the foundation of what I advanced before.” (Postscript, Apocalyptical Key)

John Gill
“that this is to be understood of his ascension into Heaven, may easily be collected from his coming with the clouds of Heaven, which was literally fulfilled in Jesus, whom when he was taken up from the earth, a cloud received out of sight:  from his being conducted by others to the Ancient of days, as Jesus was by angels into his Father’s presence: from that dominion, glory, and kingdom, which are said to be given him, in verse 14 which well agrees with the ascension of Jesus, who being exalted at God’s right hand, was made or declared to be both Lord and Christ, all which is certainly more agreeable to the literal sense of Daniel than what the author of The Scheme of Literal Prophecy advances, who, withGrotius by the son of man, understands the “Roman kingdom;” and by coming with the clouds of Heaven, “coming with a quick motion,” which is his literal sense of this prophecy.” (The Prophecies of the Old Testament, Respecting Messiah)

Henry Hammond
“This very learned, pious, judicious man hath of late among many fallen under a very unhappy fate, being most unjustly calumniated, sometimes as a Socinian, sometimes as a Papist, and as if he had learned to reconcile Contradictories, or the most distant extreams, all that this very learned man was guilty of in this matter, was but this, his passionate desire of the unity of the Church in the bands of peace and truth, and a full dislike of all uncharitable distempers, and impious doctrines.” (Treatise on the Epistle of Ignatius, 1655)

“And it has been matter of much satisfaction to me, that what hath upon sincere desire of finding out the truth, and making my addresses to God for his particular directions in this work of difficulty.. appeared to me to be the meaning of this prophecie, hath, for this main of it, in the same manner represented it self to several persons of great piety and learning (as since I have discerned) none taking it from the other, but all from the same light shining in the Prophecie it self.  Among which number I now also find the most learned Hugo Grotius, in those posthumous notes of his on the Apocalypse, lately publish’d.” (Paraphrase and Annotations, introduction to the Apocalypse)

“Protestant statesman and theologian, Hugo Grotius, had a Jesuit friend, named Petavius. Grotius said he wanted peace between Catholics and Protestants and he used his diplomacy to achieve this end. To do this he studied Jesuit Alcazar’s Preterist interpretation, and wrote his own anti-Protestant commentary on the Antichrist (1620) He bought into the Jesuit counter interpretation so strongly that he believed the pope was not mentioned in any of the prophecies.  Other Protestants were shocked at his writings and wrote to refute him, yet his works marked the beginning of others following his lead. ” (The Counter-Reformation)

“Dutch jurist, statesman, theologian, and historian who was born at Delft and educated at the University of Leiden. After practicing law for a time and holding public office, in 1613 he was appointed pensionary of the city of Rotterdam, a post that carried with it a seat in the States General of Holland and later in the States General of the United Netherlands. This position brought him into Dutch politics at a time of intense struggle between the Calvinists and the Arminians. As a leader of the Arminians when the Calvinist side won, he was sentenced to life imprisonment (1618). In 1621 he escaped from prison in a book chest and made his way to France. He returned to Holland briefly in 1631, but most of the remainder of his life was spent in Paris, where he served for a time (1634-45) as Swedish ambassador. Grotius was an ardent student of religion who wrote on theology, scriptural interpretations, and church government. One of his most popular books, On the Truth of the Christian Religion (1627), was intended as a missionary manual for those who had contact with pagans and Muslims. It presented the evidences for the Christian faith based on natural revelation. Another work, De Satisfactione Christi (1617), espoused the governmental theory of the atonement. This view regarded God as the ruler of the world who could in a sense relax the law that death followed sin and allow Christ to suffer as a penal example so that sin could be forgiven and yet the fundamental law of the universe be upheld.” (From EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY edited by Walter Elwell © Copyright 1984, by Baker Book HouseCompany.)

Dr. John Owen (See Below)

Rev. William Patton (1877)
“Nation shall rise up against nation.”1- This, says Grotius, means “that the Jews and the people of other nations, dwelling in the same cities, should kill one another.” This was fulfilled at Caesarea, where the Jews and Syrians contended about the right of the city, and more than 20,000 Jews were slain, and the city entirely cleared of them.” (The Judgment of Jerusalem (Chapter V)

(On His Revelation Views)
“The notion of Grotius, upon which his interpretation of the Apocalypse is founded, is this: That the seven kings or heads of the beast mentioned, Rev. 17:10, are not to be understood of seven several forms of government, but of seven particular emperors, viz., Claudius, Nero, Galba, Otho, Vitellius, Vespasian and Titus, and that Domitian is the eighth, who was of the seventh; because, as he pretends, he governed during his father’s absence.

The foundation which he lays for the probation of this is, that John was banished into Patmos, in the reign of Claudius: but that though he saw his visions then, he did not write them till Vespasian’s time. For he must make this last supposition, as well as the first, else his notion would be condemned immediately, seeing, it is said, that five of these kings were fallen, Rev. 17:19; that is, says he and Hammond, when he wrote, not when he saw these visions.” (Robert Fleming, A postscript)

“The Commentary of Grotius is also worthy of comparison with that of Calvin. He is very precise and minute in shewing how the history of the East has borne out the truthfulness of the predictions; and is, perhaps, more accurate in details than his predecessor he differs, indeed, in a few points of importance, which will be separately noticed, but, on the whole, his remarks are correct and judicious. The Ten Kings of the seventh chapter (Daniel 7) he considers to be Syrian Monarchs, and enumerates them as Seleuci, Antioch, and Ptolemaei. Polanus and Junius, two Commentators who are constantly quoted by poole, in his Synopsis, treat. the passage in a similar way. The king to arise after them is still confined to the Jewish era, and “the Time, Times,” etc., are supposed to be literally three years and a, half. The 36th verse of chapter 11 (Daniel 11:36), Grotius interprets of Antiochus Epiphanes, and is supported by Junius, Polanus, Maldonatus, Willet, and Broughton. The “Days” of the twelfth chapter are taken literally by all the Commentators quoted by Poole from Calvin to Mede, and all sup — pose the period intended to be during the reign of the successors of Alexander. Mede was the well-known reviver of the Year-Day theory. Before his time it was a vague assertion, he first gave it shape, and form, and plausible consistency, and since his (lay it has been adopted by many intelligent Critics, among whom are Sir Isaac Newton, Bishop Newton, Faber, Frere, Keith, And Birks.” (AT CCEL)

Milton Terry
“Grotius, Wetstein, Whitby, and others, hold that this prophecy of the man of sin was fulfilled before the destruction of Jerusalem, which event they also regard as coincident with the parousia.” (Biblical Hermeneutics, p. 460)

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

A child prodigy and remarkable international law theorist, Grotius helped form a concept of international society. International society is a community that is joined together by the notion that states and rulers have rules that apply to other states and rulers. This law of nations is subject to all men and all nations and is held together by written agreement in states of instituted customs. The applications of international relations and political implications of the international society (possibly called “world” or “global” community in more contemporary times) can presently be seen in governments like that of the United States and much of Europe. As coined by King Henry IV in 1598, Grotius (who was only 15 at the time) truly was “the miracle of Holland.”

Richard Baxter: “I must in Gratitude Profess that I have learnt more from Grotius then from almost any Writer.. that ever I read.” (Calendar I, no. 234 n. I.)

Froom: “When Grotius’ authorship of the book was detected, it turned all orthodox theologians against him’, (‘The Prophetic Faith Of Our Fathers’, volume 2, page 510, 1954)

Henry Hammond: “all that this very learned man was guilty of in this matter, was but this, his passionate desire of the unity of the Church in the bands of peace and truth, and a full dislike of all uncharitable distempers, and impious doctrines” (Treatise On The Epistle of Ignatius, 1655)

Benjamin Marshall
“First, As to Grotius, What hath he said as to the accomplishment of this part of the Prophecy ? — Hath he referr’d it to the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans only in a Secondary Sense? — So far from it, that he hath actually referred the Expressions taken by our blessed Saviour (In Matt. 24:15) from the Prophet Daniel immediately, and primarily to that Destruction. He hath (In Matt. 24:15 Jesus respects Daniel 9:27) positively told us that Christ had regard here to Daniel 9:27. In other places of Daniel, he saith, We grant to the Jews, (and we do so likewise to this Writer,) the Prophet treats of the times of Antioch Epiphanes, but no so here. — Grotius goes on to expose the great absurdity of the modern Jews, their referring this place of Daniel to the times of Antiochus : Whereas the ancient Jews, as he also tells us, understood it of the Destruction of Jerusalem. (vii,viii)”

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• Henry More (1708) “A confutation of Grotius, his Interpretation, out of our Joint-Exposition” [Early critical analysis of Futurism (Ribera) and Preterism (Grotius)]

• Viewed to Have Inspired Milton’s Paradise Lost Tiemen De Vries “it seems probable that, whatever else Milton may have read or known about the theme of Paradise Lost, he got from Hugo Grotius the deciding inspiration for the great theme, for the development of which the following years in Milton’s life became so exceedingly favorable. In England the idea that Milton got his first inspiration for Paradise Lost from Grotius, has been held from a very early date, for in the Life of Milton in the English Plutarch, published in 1762, the author says on p. 124: “Mr. Lauder, in his Essay on Milton’s Life and Imitation of the Moderns, has insinuated that Milton’s first hint of Paradise Lost was taken from a tragedy of the celebrated Grotius, called Adamus Exul, and that Milton has not thought it beneath him to transplant some of that author’s beauties into his noble work, as well as some other flowers culled from the gardens of inferior geniuses; but by an elegance of art, and force of nature peculiar to him, he has drawn the admiration of the world upon passages, which, in their original authors, stood neglected and undistinguished.”  (Holland’s influence on English language and literature, p. 301)

• Jeffrey K. Jue: Heaven on Earth: Joseph Mede and the rise of millenarianism – Section 8 – Challenges from Preterists (2006) This book contributes to the ongoing revision of early modern British history by examining the apocalyptic tradition through the life and writings of Joseph Mede (1586-1638). The history of the British apocalyptic tradition has yet to undergo a thorough revision. Past studies followed a historiographical paradigm which associated millenarianism with a revolutionary agenda. A careful study of Joseph Mede, one of the key individuals responsible for the rebirth of millenarianism in England, suggests a different picture of seventeenth-century apocalypticism. The roots of Mede’s apocalyptic thought are not found in extreme activism, but in the detailed study of the Apocalypse with the aid of ancient Christian and Jewish sources. Mede’s legacy illustrates the geographical prevalence and long-term sustainability of his interpretations. This volume shows that the continual discussion of millenarian ideas reveals a vibrant tradition that cannot be reconstructed to fit within one simple historiographical narrative.
• ‎”The sixteenth century marked the increase of the historical-prophetic exegetical method, while the seventeenth century witnessed the dominance of this hermeneutic. Yet within this historicist tradition in England, two competing interpretations arose. The New England pastor, Increase Mather, expressed his opinion of …the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius and his most ardent English supporter Henry Hammond in one of his dissertations:

• “As for Grotius, I look on my self as concerned to warn young Scholars to beware of him, lest they suck down Poison when they think they have found Honey.  He has by perverse Expositions and Interpretations in his Annotations on the Bible, corrupter many Texts of Scripture .. Dr. Hammond has borrowed most of his Narrations from Grotius (especially his apocalyptical ones) whoever compares them will quickly discern.”
• “All millenarians in the same strand as Mede shared Mather’s scathing sentiments, because Grotius, Hammond and later the puritan pastor Richard Baxter provided the strongest and most sustained opposition against a millennarian eschatology.” (Heaven and earth, p. 150)

• “Katherine Firth describes their interpretation as a “New Way,” which solicited repeated responses from those who contained to follow Mede.”
• “Most shocking and revolting to nearly all seventeenth-century Protestants was Grotius’ denial in 1640 that the papacy was the Antichrist.”

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The Miracle of Holland: Hugo Grotius: Naturalist, Eclectic, or Theonomist?

By William Greene, Ph.D.

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"Al is de Leughen snel, de Waarheydt achterhaaltse wel."

“Though lies move fast,
Truth catches up at last."
–Old Dutch proverb,

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Hugo de Groot of Holland, better known by his Latin name Hugo Grotius, is an almost legendary figure today in several respects. Born in Delft in 1583 on Easter Day, he was a child prodigy, and joined the University of Leyden at the age of twelve, earning his doctorate by the age of fifteen. 1 By the year 1607, he had been appointed "Advocate-Fiscal" of Holland, an office which could be said to have functioned as Attorney-General, Public Prosecutor, and Sheriff. 2 Dutch children still remember him, due to his daring escape from prison in a trunk after being arrested for being on the wrong side of a politico-religious controversy. He fled to France, where the king hailed him as "the miracle of Holland." 3
He is best known today, however, as one of the pioneering figures in the field of modern international law (called by many "the father of modern international law"); he was one of the first modern theorists to systematically propose the existence of norm s in the conduct of relations between states. His major work, On the Law of War and Peace , specifically addressed the questions of jus ad bellum and jus in bellum. Grotius considered war a "necessary evil," and he discussed problems related to war in order for the conduct of war to be regulated. Due to the "unstableness of human nature," he did not think it likely that the society of man could achieve "perfect uni ty and harmony," but he did set up an ideal to aim for. 4 Bull (1990) states that De Jure Belli ac Pacis is a work

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1 R.W. Lee, Hugo Grotius (London: Oxford University, 1930), pp. 3-4.
2 Lee, p. 8.
3 Lee, p. 6.
4 William Vasilio Sotirovich, Grotius’ Universe: Divine Law and a Quest for Harmony (New York: Vantage, 1978), p. 33.

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which is necessary for understanding international relations today, both in Europe and elsewhere, because it puts forth the concept of "international society: the notion that states and rulers of states are bound by rules and form a society or community w ith one another, of however rudimentary a kind." 1
While the works of Grotius which deal primarily with international law are best known in international relations literature today, the works which had the greatest political implications in his time were his theological (and, to a lesser extent, historica l) writings. 2 In fact, his expectation for the "community of mankind" was to reach an "approximation to the ideal which Christ set up as the goal." 3 According to University of Florida Germanic philologist Gellinek (1984), until recent times, "Grotius’ authority as an epochal biblical scholar was freely acknowledged." Today, however, this scholarship seems to have been forgotten. 4 As Sotirovich (1978) notes, though, evaluating Grotius’ international theory "remains one-sided if the ethical precepts guiding that theory are ignored." 5 This paper intends to analyze those precepts, in order to ascertain whether Grotius, a premier theorist in international law, can be said to have subscribed to one of the three

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1 Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in Bull, et al., Hugo Grotius and International Relations .
2 Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in Bull, et al.
3 Sotirovich, p. 33.
4 Christian J. Gellinek, "Hugo Grotius: 1583-1983 and Beyond," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquim , p. 20.
5 Sotirovich, p. 84.

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major schools of thought concerning its sources: 1 the naturalist school of thought, the positivist school, or the eclectic school, or whether in fact he falls within an entirely separate category, the theonomist school. A short overview of the major schools of thought would therefore be in order for this analysis.
Those within the "naturalist" school of thought adhered to the belief, essentially stemming from the medieval period, that all law is derived from and rests on principles of natural law. Some of the more prominent writers in this tradition include Pufendorf, Vitoria, Suarez, and Lorimer. 2 These writers all accepted the notion that "international obligations are derived from a higher law."
"Positivists," including such scholars as Bynkershoek, Gentili, Zouche, Moser, and Austin, believed that international law, rather than resting on a "higher law," is instead derived only from agreement among the actors involved. They separated law from a ny normative concepts and focused on studying such positive sources of law as customs and treaties. As Grieves (1977) observes, the positivists were fairly skeptical about the vague and abstract nature of the "higher principles" claimed to exist by the na turalists. They preferred instead as the source of law "concrete and positive human action," believing that "what nations actually did provided more relevant norms for the conduct of international relations." Austin (b. 1790) went so far as to argue that international law was not really law at all, since "true" law can only be derived from a sovereign authority,

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1 Onuma Yasuaki, "Conclusion: Law Dancing to the Accompaniment of Love and Calculation," in Onuma Yasuaki, ed., A Normative Approach to War .
2 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Columbia University, 1977), pp. 28-31.

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and there was no such authority on a global scale. 1 The rise of the "eclectic" school of thought was designed to present a middle ground in reaction to the extremes of the former schools. The eclectics argued that, while natural law is one (ultimate) source of law, positive law is another source, being an interpretation of the higher law. Since this interpretation by man is fallible, it is therefore not immutable, but can be adapted to situations as the actors involved see fit. One of the most prominent thinkers from this school was Vattel in his Law of the Nations (1758).
It must be noted, for the purposes of this enquiry, that there exists today a division of opinion among academics over the definition of natural law: specifically, the division lies over what "higher law" is being adhered to as a source of "man-made" law . Harding (1954) explains that

while the terminology of Natural Law has been virtually unchanged through the centuries, the connotations and sometimes even the denotations of the words have been subject to change. So in Justinians’s Digest we find that sometimes Natural Law means the magnificent Stoic concept of order as reflected by Cicero, and at other times means merely the jus gentium, the common jural experience of divers peoples in divers environments. In other hands Natural Law means simply the command of a living God. 2

The dichotomy in existence today is between the "traditional" and the "modern" definitions of natural law. The traditional definition originally held that the norms of natural law are established by God; this may be

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1 Forest L. Grieves, Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 248-249.
2 Arthur L. Harding, "The Ghost of Herbert Spencer: A Darwinian Concept of Law," in Harding, ed. Origins of the Natural Law Tradition (Port Washington NY: Kennikat, 1954), p. 70.

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called the "theonomist" position (theonomy = "God’s law"). 1 One of the earliest examples of this attempt to equate natural law with revealed or divine law can be found in seventh-century churchman Isodore of Seville’s writings; 2 another canonist in twelfth century Bologna, Gratian, was typical of the "high medieval period clerics in their tendency to fuse natural and divine law." He made an effort to not only associate natural law with both Old and New Testament Scripture, but a lso to equate natural law with the "Golden Rule" of Jesus ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"). 3
It was Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologioe (1274), who established a foothold for debate as to the belief that there could be a source of norms for relations between nations apart from God’s law; that source was reason. He states that

the plan by which God, as ruler of the universe, governs all things, is a law in the true sense. And since it is not a plan conceived in time we call it the eternal law … Reasoning creatures follow God’s plan in a more profound way, themselves sharing the planning … This distinctive sharing in the eternal law we call the natural law, the law we have in us by nature. For the light of natural reason by which we tell good from evil (the law that is in us by nature) is itself an imprint of God’s light in us. 4

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1 Greg L. Bahnsen, By This Standard: The Authority of God’s Law Today (Tyler TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), p. 361. "‘Theonomists’ preach and promote biblical law’s authority and wisdom, praying that citizens will be persuaded willingly to adopt God’s standards as the law of the land." Bahnsen, p. 322.
2 Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p. 37.
3 Edwards, pp. 37-38.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologioe (Westminster MD: Christian Classics, 1989 [1274]), p. 281.

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Edwards (1981) notes that Aquinas’ formulation was of great import, due to the fact that "he, a Scholastic churchman, had legitimized a basic source for all of the precepts of a law of nations, and that source was independent of God’s revelation through divine law. " 1
Suarez later built on this tradition and defined divine law as "that which was directly promulgated by God," what he called "positive divine law" (terminology adapted later by Grotius). He conceived natural law as discernible to men through natural reaso n, though its principles were unchangeable. In addition, Suarez acknowledged his belief that "human positive law" finds validity and confirmation " solely in the actual customs of nations." 2
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the traditional definition of natural law is the modern definition, that objective ethics and norms are established through reason, with no connection to God or theology. 3 Gordis (1961) gives an essential definition:

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1 Edwards, pp. 80-81.
2 Edwards, p. 88.
3 Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Heights NJ: Humanities, 1983), p. 3.

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Natural law declares that only that law is legitimate and has a claim upon men’s loyalty which is in harmony with human nature. Second, it believes that human nature is constant through time, not necessarily unchanging, but with sufficient continuity to make possible generalizations regarding its basic traits, its needs and desires, its limitations and potentialities. Third, it regards human nature as being universal in space, modified to be sure by environmental factors, but still sufficiently stable to permit a generalized theory. Finally, it regards human nature not as known, but as knowable, through the canons of scientific investigation and rational thought. There is nothing in natural law that negates the exploration of the dimensions of human nature as an ongoing and probably unending enterprise. 1

The enlightenment philosophe David Hume in the eighteenth century was a proponent of a similar line of thought (in addition to advocating what he called "natural"religion, based solely on reason). In the late twentieth century, libertarian philosopher Murray Rothbard has become its leading proponent.
While most scholars have been able to agree on the placement of many writers into one of the three schools of thought (Pufendorf as a naturalist, Bynkershoek as a positivist, Vattel as an eclectic, etc.), there is disagreement over the placement of Grotius. In fact, one biographer (Lee, 1930) notes that writiers who have "lit their torches at the flame which Grotius kindled" have been called all three. 2 A fairly common practice is to classify him as an eclectic, arguing that both natural law and positive rules were sources of law. 3 Edwards (1981) claims that, for Grotius, both revealed law and natural law were "not sufficient for regulating the mutual relations among nations," 4 and that he did not hold the position either that "all law had to emanate directly from the will of God" or that "natural precepts" were "wholly adequate for the validity of law." 5 Even Bull (1990) argued that "Grotius’ method is in fact an eclectic one," as evidenced by the fact that "naturalists and positivist both claim that Grotius belongs to their ancestry." 6 Oppenheim and Lauterpacht even call the eclectics "Grotians;" Yasuaki (1993) admits that this may seem

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1 Robert Gordis, "Natural Law and Religion," in Natural Law and Modern Society , p. 244.
2 Lee, p. 58.
3 For example, see Grieves, p. 249.
4 Edwards, p. 104.
5 Edwards, pp. 64-65.
6 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 79.

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reasonable upon first examination, but "further analysis at least qualifies this view." 1
Indeed, Yasuaki is simply the latest of many to challenge the notion that Grotius was an eclectic, and was instead closer to the naturalist views of theorists such as Pufendorf. 2 Even Bull admitted that Grotius emphasized natural law as "the basis of the rules affecting international relations, for the rules of natural law were rules for all men equally." 3 This law is seen as "a body of moral rules known to all rational beings, against which the mere will or practice of states can be measured;" this natural law, says Bull, "is placed at the centre [sic] of his exposition of international law." 4 Another biographer, Edwards, believed that Grotius based the laws of war entirely on reason-based natural law. 5 He writes of Grotius’ belief that, while God was the "efficient cause of social organization" since He had "willed all traits in man," including social existence, 6 he wished to separate natural law from its "traditional medieval association with Christian claims of revelation," instead formulating his theory of "rational natural law" on the "naturalistic side of religion." 7
Others, such as Elders (1984), agree that Grotius’ legal works are characterized by doctrine based on reasonable argument, common to

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1 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 363.
2 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 364.
3 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 80.
4 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 78.
5 Edwards, ch. 5 (pp. 115-138).
6 Edwards, pp. 60-61.
7 Edwards, p. 139.

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everybody, while consistently excluding religious motives. 1 Lee also states that God’s revealed law is not invoked as an "independent source" for international law, but merely to confirm the law of nature, and to inculcate a desirable ideal. 2 Rothbard goes so far as to state that Grotius elaborated an independent natural law in "a purely secular context," since his interests were not "primarily theological." 3 Yasuaki follows the same line, insisting that the key to Grotius’ "normative approach" was a"secularized" natural law. 4
According to commentators such as those above, the reason Christian ethics appear to be the basis of Grotian norms is that his contemporaries in Europe were still heavily directed and influenced by Christian-based societal norms. Since natural law therefore came to embrace many aspects of these ethics, "Grotius’ concept of natural law was substantiated not only by rules of law but also by moral, ethical, and religious values shared by contemporary Europeans." 5 Some note that Grotius quoted extensively from many authors, and he simply added force to his arguments with Biblical texts (along with classical Greek and Roman texts). 6 White (1925) even claims that Grotius had to make concessions to his age by paying "every respect to the Old Testament authorities," lest his book be

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1 J.L.M. Elders, "Good Faith and Equity in the Doctrine of Grotius and its Implementation in the New Civil Code of the Netherlands," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquium , p. 32.
2 Lee, p. 54.
3 Rothbard, p. 5.
4 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 338.
5 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 339.
6 Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Hugo Grotius and the Freedom of the Seas," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquium , p. 26.

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suppressed "as blasphemous." 1
It is the contention of this paper that, while many of these authors are correct in their rebuttal of claims of Grotius’ eclecticism, they are likely mistaken in their arguments that his system of norms was purely secular and reason-based. A probable cause of these errors is the failure to read Grotius’ works in context. This could be done fairly easily, if only certain passages are selected from his various writings.
For example, Grotius writes that divine or revealed law – "contrary to the practice of most men – I have distinguished from the law of nature, considering it as certain that in that most holy law a greater degree of moral perfection is enjoined upon us than the law of nature, alone and by itself, would require." 2 He also states that "Natural Law is the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act … is forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature … Natural law is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself." 3 He goes on to discuss how, while all laws originate with God, human laws are created by man (and are temporary) and approved by God; Divine laws (which are eternal) are created directly by God: 4 "This law proceeds from God… it is approved by the common consent of all mankind … the mutual agreement and the will of individuals … ‘the

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1 Andrew Dickson White, "Grotius’ ‘De Jure Belli Ac Pacis,’" in Lysen, Hugo Grotius , pp. 55-56.
2 Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1975 [1625]), p. 31 (#50).
3 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 1 (Cambridge: John W. Parker, 1853 [1625]), pp. 10-12.
4 Sotirovich, p. 15.

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common pact of the state.’" 1 Standing apart from the rest of his writings, such quotations could be misconstrued in the direction of secularization. However, such a direction was not Grotius’ intention at all.
Grotius’ works must be taken in context, as a whole, in order to fully grasp his normative orientations. For many, this task is not simple; Bull admits that Grotius’ writings are "difficult to read, even in English translation, encumbered as they are with the biblical and classical learning with which in Grotius’ generation it was thought helpful to buttress theoretical arguments." 2 There are more important reasons, though, as Dumbauld (1969) notes:

Biblical writers are drawn on copiously … His erudition seems somewhat excessive and distracting to a modern reader. But Grotius desired to be complete and comprehensive, esteeming lack of historical documentation (from which alone the rules of the law of nations can be proved) to be the chief fault of previous writers. 3

A reading of the primary source material suggests that man-made (positive) laws, even when "deduced" from natural law’s ethical concepts, were not always valid. 4 Grotius believed in a "primary law of nations" which was applicable to all men and nations, and in a "secondary law" which was defined in written pacts and agreements between states and in

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1 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950 [1868]), p. 23 (in Sotirovich, p. 52).
2 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 65.
3 Edward Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Works of Hugo Grotius (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma, 1969), p. 76.
4 Sotirovich, p. 3.

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the established custom among those states. 1 The key lies in Grotius’ interpretation of the "law of mankind: first, the human reading of that law in nature; second, Christ’s definition of that law as derived from Divine law. The function of the law of Christ is, therefore, to lead man from the fi rst to the second stage." 2 Lee agrees that Grotius believed that natural law is the law of God, "for God is the author of nature," and that God’s will is declared in the Bible, which is a source for law. 3 For Grotius, God was not just "Nature’s God" (as Thomas Jefferson believed), or the "Supreme Being" of the French Revolution, but was the "Omnipotent Christian God."4 When he uses the term "natural law," it may be taken to mean the same concept as Aquinas’ "eternal law," not as something "derived from" revealed law. 5 Grotius writes:

the law of nature of which we have spoken, comprising alike that which relates to the social life of man and that which is so called in a larger sense, proceeding as it does from the essential traits implemented in man, can nevertheless rightly be attr ibuted to God because of his having willed that such traits exist in us. 6

God wills that we should protect ourselves, retain our hold on the necessities of life, obtain that which is our due, punish transgressors, and at the same time defend our state. 7

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1 Sotirovich, p. 88.
2 Sotirovich, p. 41.
3 Lee, pp. 53-54.
4 Sotirovich, p. 9.
5 Sotirovich, p. 4.
6 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 11 (#12).
7 Grotius, Commentary , p. 31 (in Sotirovich, p. 22).

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There are some who urge that the Old Testament sets forth the law of nature. Without doubt they are in error… 1

What is Divine Law is sufficiently apparent from the term itself; namely, that which has its origin from the Divine Will; by which character it is distinguished from Natural Law … To the human race, the Law has thrice been given by God; at the Creation ; immediately after the Deluge, and at the coming of Christ. These three sets of Laws oblige all men, as soon as they acquire a sufficient knowledge of them. 2

Grotius was obviously not proposing a new "universal religion"; the rules necessary for the law of mankind and for the maintenance of peace in the society of nations were sufficiently provided by Christianity. 3 All rulers of all states are "bound" to observe God’s law, 4 and when rulers establish laws that contradict God’s laws, Grotius says that subjects "have the right to disobey such laws, and they are encouraged to terminate the rule of a sovereign who is a tyrant" (an argument earlier supported by Aquinas): 5

It is beyond controversy among all good men, that if the persons in authority command any thing contrary to Natural Law or the Divine Precepts, it is not to be done. For the Apostles, in saying that we must obey God rather than men, appealed to an undoubted rule, written in the minds of all. 6

"Natural" religion was certainly seen by Grotius as inadequate for explaining revealed law, since reason and nature could not fully reveal the

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1 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 30 (#48).
2 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 20-21.
3 Sotirovich, p. 60.
4 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 140.
5 Sotirovich, p. 55.
6 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 165.

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truth about God; only "the supernatural revelation of God in Christ" could accomplish this, since in his "Divine positive law, Christ defined the Will of God." 1 Grotius would also have rejected the atheism of modern naturalists such as Rothbard; he "would never have conceded that a system of law could exist without God, especially if the expectation of men was that such a system be good." 2
In his works on law and on government, Eidsmoe (1987) notes, Grotius was attempting to apply principles of Christianity to politics, both national and international, believing as he did in the superiority of God’s laws to human laws. The basis of his principles of international law was his belief that "God’s law transcends the laws of individual states and nations. It provides a basis by which both men and nations are to be judged." 3 Sotirovich explains that "Grotius used the ethical precepts of the New Testament … combined this with the moral code of the Old Testament and with the classical theory of natural law, thus producing a Christian interpretation of law."4
In Grotius’ eyes, the law of God had not been superceded, even by the New Testament: "the law of Christ took away only the law of Moses in so far as it separated the Gentiles from the Jews: Ephes. ii. 14." 5 By "virtue of origin," revealed law prevails over man-made law; 6 in all instances,

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1 Sotirovich, p. 27.
2 Sotirovich, p. 10.
3 John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution: The Faith of our Founding Fathers (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Book House, 1987), pp. 63-64.
4 Sotirovich, p. 31.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 60.
6 Dumbauld, p. 37.

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God’s laws are superior to human laws. 1 In this respect, Grotius writes:

Thus what happens is, and how to be secured, men may make some conjectures; but if there be anything concerning it revealed from God, that ought to be esteemed most true and most certain. 2  What God has shown to be his will that is law. 3

As can be seen, while Grotius does not deny the existence of man-made (positive) law, or the existence of natural law (as defined by him), it is revealed law which possesses primacy. This is best summed up by Sotirovich:

According to Grotius, the ontological origin and source of all law is in God. Men create laws; they are a secondary source of law. But, if these laws are to be just, their true source must always be in God. Grotius separates the two sources only for the sake of making a clear, systematic classification, but, in the final analysis, the reference is always to ‘the unerring mind of God.’" 4

In answer to charges that Grotius incorporated Biblical references as a possible "post facto" rationalization of secular ideas, in the manner of writers such as Thomas Hobbes, it must be emphasized that Grotius did not write merely in the field of law, but also (at the same time) as a theologian. While he intended to treat law as "a science independent of contemporary religious opinions," his basic presuppositions nevertheless

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1 Sotirovich, p. 51.
2 Hugo Grotius, True Religion Explained, and Defended against the Archenemies Thereof in These Times ( The Truth of the Christian Religion ) (New York: Da Capo, 1971 [1632]), pp. 59-60 (in Sotirovich, p. 27).
3 Grotius, Commentary , p. 13 (in Sotirovich, p. 46).
4 Sotirovich, p. 23.

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rested on his Christian beliefs. 1 He published many theological writings; some of the more noteworthy include De Satisfatione Christi in 1617, De Coenae Administratione in 1638, Via ad Pacen Ecclesiasticam in 1642, and Votum pro Pace Ecclesiastica in 1642. 2 His most famous and well-published theological work was The Truth of the Christian Religion in 1632, written for Dutch seamen to enable them to spread the Gospel to "the Turke, the Jewe, and the Pagan" during their travels. 3
For Grotius, the Christian religion was not merely a useful tool for proving his ideas; it was "the final revelation of God to mankind … the turning point of history. Its significance consisted in the fact that God finally revealed Himself to the individ ual, the nations and the whole community of mankind. 4 The Bible was essential in establishing the foundations of international law. An example is Grotius’ defence of the concept of just war as opposed to pacifism: he spends thirteen pages to prove "that war is not made unlawful by the law of Christ," and another eighteen pages to disprove (again from the Bible) the opposing viewpoint. 5 Later, he asserts that

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1 Sotirovich, Introduction.
2 Dumbauld, p. 14.
3 Grotius, True Religion .
4 Sotirovich, pp. 27-28.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 49-78.
6 Sotirovich, p. 60.
7 Sotirovich, p. 60.

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religion is even more useful in that larger society [of states] 6 than in civil society [of a single state] 7 … in that wider community, the execution of law is very different … these [laws] too have their sanction mainly from the fear of the divine power: and hence, they who transgress the Laws of Nations, are everywhere said to violate the divine laws. And hence the Emperors have rightly said that the infraction of religion is a wrong against all. 1

Considerably better and more dependable is the method chosen by those who prefer to have such questions decided on the basis of the Holy Writ… 2

The Bible was to be the basis for settling disputes among nations, so that justice (and its resultant "peace, freedom, and equity") could be preserved. It is God’s "Divine Positive law" which should serve as "the guide for breaking any deadlocks in inter national affairs." 3 Rewards for its observance were not limited to the afterlife, either; instead, Grotius believed that the implementation of laws based on revealed law would "transform man and human society on earth," because the citizens of the states and their rulers would realize that their individual commonwealths benefit from promoting the good of mankind. 4 On this concept, Grotius wrote:

Nevertheless law, even though without a sanction, is not entirely void of effect. For justice brings peace of conscience, while injustice causes torment and anguish … in the breasts of tyrants. Justice is approved, and injustice condemned, by the common agreement of good men. But, most important of all, in God injustice finds an enemy, justice a protector. He reserves his judgements for the life after this, yet in such a way that he often causes their effects to become manifest even in this life , as history teaches by numerous examples. 5

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1 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 2, pp. 318-319.
2 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 1, p. ii.23.34 (in Sotirovich, p. 58).
3 Sotirovich, p. 58.
4 Sotirovich, p. 33.
5 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 15 (#20).

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As a devout Christian, Grotius cherished a "burning desire" for the promulgation of Christendom. 1 He "expected that the community of mankind would enjoy order and harmony if each individual commonwealth were ruled by a prince who accepted God as his Supreme Sovereign," 2 and he believed that the Biblical predictions and promises could be realized. 3 According to his eschatology, then, "order and harmony" in the world would come when the majority of people became Christians and followed Biblical law (an impossibility by human efforts alone; it required God’s grace and immanence in the world): 4

"and [they] shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore" (Isaiah, II.4.). But this prophesy, as many others, may be taken in a conditional sense. With such an interpretation undoubtedly we are to understand that such will be the state of affairs if all people receive and fulfil the law of Christ; to this end God will not suffer that there be any lack of assistance on His part. It is moreover certain that if all men were Christians, and were living the Christian life, there would be no wars. 5

In assessing Grotius’ works taken as a whole, then, it can be concluded that this premier theorist in modern international law was most certainly not an eclectic, nor was he a naturalist in the modern sense of the word. He could possible be characterized as a "traditional" naturalist, but with the preponderance of evidence that he subscribed to the ascendancy of revealed law over all other sources, it is more likely that he comes closest

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1 Dumbauld, p. 14.
2 Sotirovich, p. 7.
3 Sotirovich, p. 33.
4 Sotirovich, pp. 83-84.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 61-62.

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to the theonomist school of thought.
The question may legitimately be asked, then, whether Grotius’ teachings and opinions have any significance for today. Röling (1990) believes they no longer do, for three reasons: technological development, the "process of democratization within the nation-state," and the "process of democratization in the world at large, that is, in the expansion of the number of states forming the legal community in which international law plays it role." 1 In other words, we are more advanced than people in Grotius’ time, we are more secularized, and there are more countries than the few that Grotius needed to contend with. Therefore, Grotius is fairly irrelevant today.
Others disagree. Sotirovich, for example, contends that

the influence of Grotius on human thought has been of a lasting value. His basic propositions remain the necessary requirements for the international order. With his law of peace, he presented to the world the ideal conception of a family of nations, united under the Sovereignty of God, in a comonwealth of mankind. Thus, Grotius must be regarded as one of the chief expounders of the basic ideals that are contained in documents like the League of Nations Covenant, the United Nations Charter, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 2

Perhaps the most important contribution Grotius made is also among the most rejected in today’s positivist (and realist) approach to international law: the belief that a state is always "a composite of individuals," and not "an abstract entity with a personality of its

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1 B.V.A. Röling, "Are Grotius’ Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?" In Bull, et al.
2 Sotirovich, p. 85.

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own." 1 To many modern writers, international law is "a law between states creating rights and duties for states, not for individuals. This involves the dangerous consequence that individual morality is one thing, state morality (if such there be) another. But this is not what Grotius intends." 2 His whole system has the underlying assumption that moral laws apply to the individual and the state equally, with "a potential dynamism in both for the preservation of peace and for the promotion of the common good." 3 It is this idea that has come into greater prominence of late, and it is one aspect of that "ideal" towards which Grotius saw international society inevitably moving.

And now if anything has here been said by me inconsistent with piety, with good morals, with Holy Writ, with the concord of the Christian Church, or with any aspect of truth, let it be as if unsaid. 4

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1 Edwards, p. 210.
2 Lee, p. 55.
3 Sotirovich, pp. 74-75.
4 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 36.

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THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE

 

BOOK 1

• Chap.   1: What is War? What is Law?
• Chap.   2: Whether It Is Ever Lawful to Wage War
• Chap.   3: Distinction Between Public & Private War; Sovereignty Explained
• Chap.   4: War of Subjects Against Superiors
• Chap.   5: Who May Lawfully Wage War

BOOK 2

• Chap.   1: The Causes of War; First, Defense of Self and Property
• Chap.   2: Of Things Which Belong to Men in Common
• Chap.   3: Of Original Acquisition of Things, With Reference to Sea and Rivers
• Chap.   4: On Assumed Abandonment of Ownership and Occupation
• Chap.   5: On the Original Acquisition of Rights Over Persons
• Chap.   6: On Secondary Acquisition of Property by The Act of Man
• Chap.   7: On Derivative Acquisition of Property in Accordance With Law
• Chap.   8: On Acquisitions Commonly Said to Be by the Law of Nations
• Chap.   9: When Sovereignty or Ownership Ceases
• Chap. 10: On the Obligation Which Arises from Ownership
• Chap. 11: On Promises
• Chap. 12: On Contracts
• Chap. 13: On Oaths
• Chap. 14: On Promises, Contracts & Oaths of Those Holding Sovereign Power
• Chap. 15: On Treaties and Sponsions
• Chap. 16: On Interpretation
• Chap. 17: On Damage Caused Through Injury, and the Obligation Arising
• Chap. 18: On The Right of Legation
• Chap. 19: On The Right of Sepulchre
• Chap. 20: On Punishments
• Chap. 21: On The Sharing of Punishments
• Chap. 22: On the Unjust Causes of War
• Chap. 23: On Doubtful Causes of War
• Chap. 24: Warnings Not to Undertake War Rashly, Even for Just Causes
• Chap. 25: On The Causes of Undertaking War on Behalf of Others
• Chap. 26: On Just Causes for War Waged by Those Under Another’s Rule

BOOK 3

• Chap.   1: The Law of Nature Regarding What Is Permissible in War
• Chap.   2: How Goods of Subjects May Be Held for Debts of Their Rulers
• Chap.   3: On War That Is Lawful or Public According to the Law of Nations
• Chap.   4: On The Right of Killing Enemies in a Public War & Other Violence
• Chap.   5: On Devastation And Pillage
• Chap.   6: On The Right of Acquiring Things Taken in War
• Chap.   7: On The Right Over Prisoners of War
• Chap.   8: On the Right to Rule over the Conquered
• Chap.   9: On Postliminy
• Chap. 10: Cautions in Regard to Things Which Are Done in an Unlawful War
• Chap. 11: Moderation with Respect to the Right of Killing in a Lawful War
• Chap. 12: Moderation in Laying Waste and Similar Things
• Chap. 13: Moderation in Regard to Captured Property
• Chap. 14: Moderation in Regard to Prisoners of War
• Chap. 15: Moderation in the Acquisition of Sovereignty
• Chap. 16: Moderation in Regard to Things Having No Right of Postliminy
• Chap. 17: On Those Who Are of Neither Side in War
• Chap. 18: On Acts Done by Individuals in a Public War
• Chap. 19: On Good Faith Between Enemies
• Chap. 20: On The Good Faith of States to End War; Also Peace Treaties
• Chap. 21: On Good Faith During War; Also Truces, Safe-conduct & Ransom
• Chap. 22: On the Good Faith of Subordinate Powers in War
• Chap. 23: On Good Faith of Private Persons in War
• Chap. 24: On Implied Good Faith
• Chap. 25: Conclusion, with Admonitions on Behalf of Good Faith and Peace
  

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  Lucanus, Marcus Annaeus [Lucan].  Pharsalia, sive de bello civili Caesaris et Pompeii lib. X…. Hugonis Grotii notae…. Amsterodami: Apud Ioannem Blaeu, 1643. 12mo (13.3 cm, 5.5″). A–O¹²; 330 pp., [3] ff.
  $250.00
  
  

  • •  This 1643 Blaeu edition has notes by Hugo Grotius and an engaging engraved title-page.

  •  Schweiger, Handbuch der classischen Bibliographie, II, 563–64. On Lucan, see: Oxford Companion to Classical Literature 328–29. Vellum over paste boards; spine with inked title: lightly soiled with a few small spots. A pair of inkspots on title-page, touching top of engraving; otherwise scattered light spotting and traces of soiling only. Bookplate on front pastedown. Inked ownership inscriptions of “C[?]. Fabricius,” “M.G. Boettneri,” and “KT” on front free endpaper, and another (more difficult to decipher) in bottom margin of title-page. Inked notations on rear pastedown and front free endpaper. All edges speckled blue and red.

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  Dr. John Owen

  SECOND CONSIDERATION ON THE ANNOTATIONS OF GROTIUS
  AT THE END OF WORKS, VOLUME 12.

  COMPLETE TEXT

  IN REFERENCE UNTO THE DOCTRINE OF THE DEITY AND SATISFACTION OF CHRIST; WITH A DEFENCE OF THE CHARGE FORMERLY LAID AGAINST THEM.

  PREFATORY NOTE.

  HENRY HAMMOND, the chaplain of Charles I., and the sub-dean of Christ Church, Oxford, from which office he was expelled by the Parliamentary visitors in 1648, was a divine of eminent learning, and, besides other works, was the author of “Annotations on Scripture,” which still deserve to be consulted, although disfigured by his habit of explaining much in the New Testament by reference to the Gnostic heresy. He was the opponent of Owen on several questions, relating to the nature of church-government, the authority of the Ignatian Epistles, and the orthodoxy of Hugo Grotius.

  In 1617 Grotius published a refutation of the errors of Faustus Socinus, entitled, “A Defence of the Catholic Faith concerning the Satisfaction of Christ.” Though opposed to the Socinians, the work was not deemed in perfect harmony with orthodox sentiment. Ravensperger in consequence assailed him, in a work entitled, “Judicium de Libro Grotii,” etc. G.J.

  Vessius came to his defense in the following year. On the part of the Socinians, Crellius replied to Grotius. A complimentary letter from the latter to his opponent confirmed the suspicions entertained of his own orthodoxy Crellius was answered by Essenius, Velthuysenius, and Stillingfleet.

  Owen, in the preface to his treatise on the “Perseverance of the Saints,” had alluded to Dr Hammond as indebted to Grotius “for more than one rare notion” in his expositions of Scripture. An elaborate reply to the whole argument of Dr Owen against the Ignatian Epistles, contained in the same preface, appeared in 1655 from the pen of Hammond, and under the title, “An Answer to the Animadversions on the Dissertations concerning the Epistles of Ignatius.” In the course of it, a digression was introduced vindicating Grotius from charges which Owen certainly had not mooted, but in which, to a certain extent, he could not refrain from concurring.

  These charges were, that towards the close of his life the learned Dutchman had veered towards Socinianism, and had become favorable to the interests of the church of Rome. In regard to the charge of Socinian leanings, it was founded partly on his letter to Crellius, partly on certain expressions which fell from him on his death-bed, and partly on his Scholia on the Bible. Two volumes of these Scholia appeared in 1641 and 1644, before the death of Grotius; and two, one including the Acts and the Epistles of Paul and James, and the other including the six Catholic Epistles and the Revelation, were published posthumously in 1646 and 1650. These Scholia contain expositions of Scripture which differ considerably from what Grotius had given in his work “De Satisfactione Christi.” Hammond argues that his letter to Crellius was but an interchange of civilities, in which he was not called to discuss the points of controversy between them; gives a different version of his death-bed utterances; and maintains that the posthumous Scholla, because contrary to the opinions which he avowed in his lifetime, were notes taken by Grotius in the course of his reading, and by no means to be regarded as expressing his own views. Owen, in his “Vindiciae Evangelicae,” proceeded to trace the perfect correspondence between Grotius and the Socinians, in their exegesis of those passages in Scripture which relate to the person of Christ. Hammond issued his “Second Defence of Grotius.” Owen answered him in the following treatise; and was answered by his indefatigable adversary in “A Continuation of the Defence of Grotius.” If the position of Owen had been that Grotius was in reality a Socinian, he would have been worsted in this collision with Hammond; but he guards himself against being supposed to assume it, making express admission that Grotius allowed one text to be proof of the Savior’s Godhead. That Grotius played into the hands of the enemy, by the surrender of almost every other scriptural fortress in defense of this cardinal doctrine, and spoke of it in terms which betokened no very cordial appreciation of its importance, is what Owen asserted, and what cannot be disproved, except by the most worthless special pleading. Hammond could only make out his ease for Grotius by denying all authority to his posthumous Annotations, “which,” says he, “I deem not competent measures to judge him by.” —ED.

  A SECOND CONSIDERATION OF THE ANNOTATIONS OF HUGO GROTIUS.

  HAVING, in my late defense of the doctrine of the gospel from the corruptions of the Socinians, been occasioned to vindicate the testimonies given in the Scripture to the deity of Christ from their exceptions, and finding that Hugo Grotius, in his Annotations, had (for the most part) done the same things with them as to that particular, and some other important articles of the Christian faith, that book of his being more frequent in the hands of students than those of the Socinians, I thought it incumbent on me to do the same work in reference to those Annotations which it was my design to perform towards the writings of Socinus, Smalcius, and their companions and followers. What I have been enabled to accomplish by that endeavor, with what service to the gospel hath been performed thereby, is left to the judgment of them who desire ajlhqeu>ein ejn ajga>ph . Of my dealing with Grotius I gave a brief account in my epistle to the governors of the university, and that with reference to an apology made for him not long before. This hath obtained a new apology, under the name of “A Second Defence of Hugo Grotius;” with what little advantage either to the repute of Grotius as to the thing in question or of the apologist himself, it is judged necessary to give the ensuing account, for which I took the first leisure hour I could obtain, having things of greater weight daily incumbent on me. The only thing of importance by me charged on those Annotations of Grotius was this, — that the texts of Scripture, both in the Old Testament and New, bearing witness to the deity and satisfaction of Christ, are in them wrested to other senses and significations, and the testimonies given to those grand truths thereby eluded. Of those of the first kind I excepted one, yet with some doubt, lest his expressions therein ought to be interpreted according to the analogy of what he had elsewhere delivered; of which afterward.

  Because that which concerns THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST will admit of the easiest despatch, though taking up most room, I shall in the first place insist thereon. The words of my charge on the Annotations, as to this head of the doctrine of the Scripture, are these: “The condition of these famous Annotations as to the satisfaction of Christ is the same; — not one text in the whole Scripture wherein testimony is given to that sacred truth which is not wrested to another sense, or at least the doctrine in it concealed and obscured by them.”

  This being a matter of fact, and the words containing a crime charged on the Annotations, he that will make a defense of them must either disprove the assertion by instances to the contrary, or else, granting the matter of fact, evince it to be no crime. That which is objected in matter of fact “aut negandum est aut defendendum,” says Quintilian, lib. 5:cap. de Refut., and “extra haec in judiciis fere nihil est.” In other cases, “patronus neget, defendat, transferat, excuset, deprecetur, molliat, minuat, avertat, despiciat, derideat;” but in matters of fact the first two only have place. Aristotle allows more particulars for an apologist to divert unto, if the matter require it. He may say of what is objected, H wjv oujk e]stin h\ wJv ouj blaberotw| h\ wJv ouj thlikou~to h\ oujk a]dikon h\ ouj me>ga h\ oujk aijscrogeqov (Rhet. lib. 3 cap. 15); all which, in a plain matter of fact, may be reduced to the former heads. That any other apology can or ought to take place in this or any matter of the same importance will not easily be proved. The present apologist takes another course; such ordinary paths are not for him to walk in. He tells us of the excellent book that Grotius wrote, “De Satisfactione Christi,” and the exposition of sundry places of Scripture, especially of divers verses of Isaiah 53 given therein, and then adds sundry inducements to persuade us that he was of the same mind in his “Annotations;” and this is called a defense of Grotius! The apologist, I suppose, knows full well what texts of Scripture they are that are constantly pleaded for the satisfaction of Christ by them who do believe that doctrine. I shall also for once take it for granted that he might without much difficulty have obtained a sight of Grotius’ Annotations; to which I shall only add, that probably, if he could from them have disproved the assertion before mentioned by any considerable instances, he is not so tender of the prefacer’s credit as to have concealed it on any such account. But the severals of his plea for the Annotations in this particular, I am persuaded, are accounted by some worthy of consideration. A brief view of them will suffice.

  The signal place of Isaiah 53, he tells us, “he hath heard taken notice of by some” (I thought it had been probable the apologist might have taken notice of it himself), as that wherein his Annotations are most suspected, therefore on that he will fasten a while. Who would not now expect that the apologist should have entered upon the consideration of those Annotations, and vindicated them from the imputations insinuated? but he knew a better way of procedure, and who shall prescribe to him what suits his purpose and proposal?

  This, I say, is the instance chosen to be insisted on; and the vindication of the Annotations therein by the interpretation given in their author’s book, De Satisfactione Christi, is proposed to consideration. That others, if not the apologist himself, may take notice of the emptiness of such precipitate apologies as are ready to be tumbled out without due digestion or consideration, I shall not only compare the Annotations and that book as to the particular place proposed, and manifest the inconsistency of the one with the other, but also, to discover the extreme negligence and confidence which lie at the bottom of his following attempt to induce a persuasion that the judgment of the man of whom we speak was not altered (that is, as to the interpretation of the scriptures relating to the satisfaction of Christ), nor is other [i.e., different] in his Annotations than in that book, I shall compare the one with the other by sundry other instances, and let the world see how, in the most important places contested about, he hath utterly deserted the interpretations given of them by himself in his book De Satisfactione, and directly taken up that which he did oppose.

  The apologist binds me, in the first place, to that of Isaiah 53, which is ushered in by 1 Peter 2:24. “From 1 Peter 2:24,’ says the apologist, “Grotius informs us ‘that Christ so bare our sins that he freed us from them, so that we are healed by his stripes.’” This, thus crudely proposed, — Socinus himself would grant it, — is little more than barely repeating the words. Grotius goes farther, and contends that ajnh>egken , the word there used by the apostle, is to be interpreted “tulit sursum eundo, portavit;” and tells us that Socinus would render this word “abstulit,’ and so take away the force of the argument from this place. To disprove that insinuation, he urges sundry other places in the New Testament where some words of the same importance are used and are no way capable of such a signification. And whereas Socinus urges to the contrary Hebrews 9:28, where he says ajnenegkei~n aJmarti>av signifies nothing but “auferre peccata,” Grotius disproves that instance, and manifests that in that place also it is to be rendered by “tulit,” and so relates to the death of Christ.

  That we may put this instance, given us by the apologist to vindicate the Annotations from the crime charged on them, to an issue, I shall give the reader the words of his Annotations on that place. They are as follow: — Ov taav hJmw~n aujtonegken, etc. Anh>egken hic est abstulit, quod sequentia ostendunt, quomodo idem verbum sumi notavimus, Hebrews 9:28, eodem sensu; a]irei aJmarti>an , Johan. 1:29; et ac;n; et lbæs; , Esa 52:4, ubi Graeci fe>rei . Vitia nostra ita interfecit, sicut qui cruci affiguntur interfici solent. Simile loquendi genus, Colossians 2:14; vide Romans 6:6, Galatians 2:20, 5:24. Est autem hic meta>lhyiv . Non enim proprie Christus cum crucifigeretur vitia nostra abstulit, sed causas dedit per quas auferrentur. Nam crux Christi fundamentum est praedicationis; praedicatio veto poenitentiae: poenitentia vero aufert vitia.”

  How well the annotator abides here by his former interpretation of this place the apologist may easily discover. 1. There he contends that ajnh>egke , is as much as “tulit” or “sursum tulit, ” and objects out of Socinus that it must be “abstulit,” which quite alters the sense of the testimony; here he contends, with him, that it must be “abstulit.” 2. There, Hebrews 9:28 is of the same importance with this 1 Peter 2:24, as there interpreted; here, “as here,” — that is in a quite contrary sense, altogether inconsistent with the other. 3. For company, lbæs; , used Isaiah 53:4, is called into the same signification, which in the book De Satisfactione he contends is never used in that sense, and that most truly. 4. Upon this exposition of the words he gives the very sense contended for by the Socinians: “Non enim proprie Christus cum crucifigeretur vitia nostra abstulit, sed causas dedit per quas auferrentur.” What are these causes? He adds them immediately: “Nam crux Christi fundamentum est praedicationis; praedicatio vero poenitentiae: poenitentia vero aufert vitia” He that sees not the whole Socinian poison wrapped up and proposed in this interpretation is ignorant of the state of the difference as to that head between them and Christians. 5. To make it a little more evident how constant the annotator was to his first principles, which he insisted on in the management of his disputes with Socinus about the sense of this place, I shall add the words of Socinus himself, which then he did oppose: — “Verum animadvertere oportet primum in Graeco, verbum, quod interpretes verterunt pertulit, est ajnenegkei~n , quod non pertulit sed abstulit vertendum erat, non secus ac factum fuerit in epistola ad Hebraeos, cap. 9:28, ubi idem legendi modus habetur, unde constat ajnenegkei~n aJmarti>av non perferre peccata, sed peccata tollere, sive auferre, significare,” Socin. de Jes. Christ. Serv. lib. cap. 6.

  What difference there is between the design of the annotator and that of Socinus, what compliance in the quotation of the parallel place of the Hebrews, what direct opposition and head is made in the Annotations against that book De Satisfactione, and how clearly the cause contended for in the one is given away in the other, need no farther to be demonstrated. But if this instance make not good the apologist’s assertion, it may be supposed that that which follows, which is ushered in by this, will do it to the purpose. Let, then, that come into consideration.

  This is that of Isaiah 53. Somewhat of the sense which Grotius in his book De Satisfactione contends for in this place is given us by the apologist: — The 11th verse of the chapter, which he first considers (in my book, p. 14), he thus proposes and expounds: — “Justificabit servus meus, justus multos et iniquitates ipsorum bajulabit, in Hebrews est, Lbos]yi aWh µtnO/[\wæ . Vox autem ˆ/[; iniquitatem significat, atque etiam iniquitatis poenam, 2 Reg. 7:9; vox autem lbæs; est sustinere, bajulare, quoties autem bajulare ponitur cum nomine peccati aut iniquitatis, id in omni lingua et maxime in Hebraismo significat poenas ferre;” with much more to this purpose. The whole design of the main dispute in that place is from that discourse of the prophet to prove that Jesus Christ “properly underwent the punishment due to our sins, and thereby made satisfaction to God for them.”

  To manifest his constancy to this doctrine, in his Annotations he gives such an exposition of that whole chapter of Isaiah as is manifestly and universally inconsistent with any such design in the words as that which he intends to prove from them in his book De Satisfactione. In particular (to give one instance of this assertion) he contends here that lbæs; is as much as “bajulare, portare,” and that joined with “iniquity” (in all languages, especially in the Hebrew), that phrase of “bearing iniquity” signifies to undergo the punishment due to it. In his Annotations on the place, as also in those on 1 Peter 2:24, he tells you the word signifies “auferre, ” which with all his strength he had contended against. Not to draw out this particular instance into any greater length, I make bold to tell the apologist (what I suppose he knows not) that there is no one verse of the whole chapter so interpreted in his Annotations as that the sense given by him is consistent with, nay, is not repugnant to, that which from the same verse he pleads for in his book De Satisfactione Christi. If, notwithstanding this information, the apologist be not satisfied, let him, if he please, consider what I have already animadverted on those Annotations, and undertake their vindication. These loose discourses are not at all to the purpose in hand nor to the question between us, which is solely whether Grotius, in his Annotations, have not perverted the sense of those texts of Scripture which are commonly and most righteously pleaded as testimonies given to the satisfaction of Christ. But as to this particular place of Isaiah, the apologist hath a farther plea, the sum whereof (not to trouble the reader with the repetition of a discourse so little to the purpose) comes to this head, that Grotius, in his book De Satisfactione Christi, gives the mystical sense of the chapter, under which consideration it belongs to Christ and his sufferings; in his Annotations, the literal, which had its immediate completion in Jeremiah; which was not so easily discoverable or vulgarly taken notice of. This is the sum of his first observation on this place, to acquit the annotator of the crime charged upon him. Whether he approve the application of the prophecy to Jeremiah or no, I know not. tie says, “Grotius so conceived.” The design of the discourse seems to give approbation to that conception. How the literal sense of a place should come to be less easily discovered than the mystical, well I know not. Nor shall I speak of the thing itself, concerning the literal and mystical sense supposed to be in the same place and words of Scripture, with the application of the distinction to those prophecies which have a double accomplishment, in the type and thing or person typified (which yet hath no soundness in it): but, to keep to the matter now in hand, I shall make bold, for the removal of this engine applied by the apologist, and for the preventing all possible mistake or controversy about the annotator’s after-change in this matter, to tell him that the perverting of the first, literal sense of the chapter, or giving it a completion in any person whatsoever, in a first, second, or third sense, but the Son of God himself, is no less than blasphemy; which the annotator is no otherwise freed from but by his conceiving a sense to be in the words contrary to their literal importance, and utterly exclusive of the concernment of Jesus Christ in them. If the apologist be otherwise minded, I shall not invite him again to the consideration of what I have already written in the vindication of the whole prophecy from the wretched, corrupt interpretation of the annotator (not hoping that he will be able to break through that discouragement he hath from looking into that treatise by the prospect he hath taken of the whole by the epistle), but do express my earnest desire, that, by an exposition of the severals of that chapter, and their application to any other (not by loose discourses foreign to the question in hand), he would endeavor to evince the contrary. If, on second thoughts, he find either his judgment or ability not ready or competent for such an attempt, I heartily wish he would be careful hereafter of ingenerating apprehensions of that nature in the minds of others by any such discourses as this.

  I cannot but suppose that I am already absolved from a necessity of any farther procedure as to the justifying of my charge against the Annotations, having sufficiently foiled the instance produced by the apologist for the weakening of it. But yet, lest any should think that the present issue of this debate is built upon some unhappiness of the apologist in the choice of the particulars insisted on, which might have been prevented, or may yet be removed, by the production of other instances, I shall, for their farther satisfaction, present them with sundry other the most important testimonies given to the satisfaction of Christ, wherein the annotator hath openly prevaricated, and doth embrace and propose those very interpretations and that very sense which in his book De Satisfactione Christi he had strenuously opposed.

  Page 8 of his book De Satisfactione, he pleads the satisfaction of Christ from Galatians 2:21, laying weight on this, that the word dwrea>n signifies the want of an antecedent cause, on the supposition there made. In his Annotations he deserts this assertion, and takes up the sense of the place given by Socinus, De Servatore, lib. 2 cap. 24. His departure into the tents of Socinus on Galatians 3:13 is much more pernicious. Pages 25- 27, urging that place and vindicating it from the exceptions of Socinus, he concludes that the apostle said Christ was made a curse: “Quasi dixerit Christum factum esse tw~| Qew~| ejpikata>raton, hoc est poenae a Deo irrogatae, et quidem ignominiosissimae obnoxium.” To make good this, in his Annotations he thus expounds the words: “Duplex hic figura; nam et kata>ra pro kata>ratov , quomodo circumcisio pro circumcisis, et subauditur wJv : nam Christus ita cruciatus est, quasi esset Deo kata>ratov.

  Nihil homini pessimo in hac vita pejus evenire poterat;” which is the very interpretation of the words given by Socinus which he opposed, and the same that Crellius insists upon in his vindication of Socinus against him.

  So uniform was the judgment of the annotator with that of the author of the book De Satisfactione Christi!

  Pages 32, 33, etc., are spent in the exposition and vindication of Romans 3:25,26. That expression, eijv e]ndeixin th~v dikaiosu>nhv aujtou~ , manifesting the end of the suffering of Christ, is by him chiefly insisted on.

  That by dikaiosu>nh is there intended that justice of God whereby he punisheth sin, he contends and proves from the nature of the thing itself, and by comparing the expression with other parallel texts of Scripture.

  Socinus had interpreted this of the righteousness of Christ’s fidelity and veracity, De Servatore, lib. 2 cap. 2 (“Ut ostenderet se veracem et fidelem esse”); but Crellius, in his vindication of him, places it rather on the goodness and liberality of God, “which is,” saith he, “the righteousness there intended.” To make good his ground, the annotator thus expounds the meaning of the words: “Vocem dikaiosu>nhv malim hic de bonitate interpretari, quam de fide in promissis proestandis, quia quae sequuntur non ad Judaeos solos pertinent, sed etiam ad genres, quibus promissio nulla facta erat.” He rather, he tells you, embraces the interpretation of Crellius than of Socinus; but for that which himself had contended for, it is quite shut out of doors, as I have elsewhere manifested at large.

  The same course he takes with Romans 5:10, which he insists on p. 26, and 2 Corinthians 5:18-21; concerning which he openly deserts his own former interpretation, and closes expressly with that which he had opposed, as he doth in reference to all other places where any mention is made of reconciliation, the substance of his annotations on those places seeming to be taken out of Socinus, Crellius, and some others of that party.

  That signal place of Hebrews 2:17 in this kind deserves particularly to be taken notice of. Cap. 7 p. 141, of his book De Satisfactione, he pleads the sense of that expression, Eijv to< iJla>skesqai taav tou~ laou~ , to be Ila>skesqai Qeo< tw~n aJmartiw~n , and adds, “Significat ergo ibi expiationem quae fit placando.” But Crellius; defense of Socinus had so possessed the man’s mind before he came to write his Annotations, that on that place he gives us directly his sense, and almost his words, in a full opposition to what he had before asserted: “‘ Ila>skesqai aJmarti>av . Hoc quidem loco, ut ex sequentibus apparet, est auferre peccata, sive purgare a peccato, id est, efficere ne peccetur, vires suppeditando pro modo tentationum.” So the annotator on that place, endeavoring farther to prove his interpretation! From Romans 4:25, cap. 1:p. 47 of his book De Satisfactione, he clearly proves the satisfaction of Christ, and evinces that to be the sense of that expression, “Traditus propter peccata nostra;” which he thus comments on in his Annotations: “Poterat dicere quiet mortuus est et resurrexit ut nos a peccatis justificaret, id est, liberaret. Sed amahs ajnti>qeta morti conjunxit peccata, quae sunt mors animi, resurrectioni autem adeptionem justitiae, quae est animi resuscitatio. Mire nos et a peccatis retrahit et ad justitiam ducit, quod videmus Christum mortem non formidasse pro doctrinae suae peccatis contrariae et ad justitiam nos vocantis testimonio; et a Deo suscitatum, ut eidem doctrinae summa conciliaretur auctoritas.” He that sees not, not only that he directly closes in with what before he had opposed, but also that he hath here couched the whole doctrine of the Socinians about the mediation of Christ and our justification thereby, is utterly ignorant of the state of the controversy between them and Christians.

  I suppose it will not be thought necessary for me to proceed with the comparison instituted. The several books are in the hands of most students, and that the case is generally the same in the other places pleaded for the satisfaction of Christ, they may easily satisfy themselves. Only, because the apologist seems to put some difference between his Annotations on the Revelation, as having “received their lineaments and colors from his own pencil,” and those on the Epistles, which he had not so completed; as I have already manifested that in his annotations on that book he hath treacherously tampered with and corrupted the testimonies given to the deity of our blessed Savior, so shall I give one instance from them also of his dealing no less unworthily with those that concern his satisfaction.

  Socinus, in his second book against Covet, second part, and chap. 17, gives us this account of these words of the Holy Ghost, Revelation 1:5, “Who loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood:” “Johannes in Apocalyp. cap. 1:5, alia metaphora seu translatione (quae nihil aliud est quam compendiosa quaedam comparatio) utens, dixit de Christo et ejus morte, ‘Qui dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis in sanguine suo,’ nam quemadmodum aqua abluuntur sordes corporis, sic sanguine Christi peccata, quae sordes animi sunt, absterguntur. Absterguntur, inquam, quia animus noster ab ipsis mundatur,’ etc. This interpretation is opposed and exploded by Grotius, De Satisfactione, cap. 10 p. 208, 209; the substance of it being that Christ washed us from our sins by his death, in that he confirmed his doctrine of repentance and newness of life thereby, by which we are turned from our sins, as he manifests in the close of his discourse. “Hoc saepius urgendum est,” saith Socinus, “Jesum Christum ea ratione peccata nostra abstulisse, quod effecerit, ut a peccando desistamus.” This interpretation of Socinus being re-enforced by Crellius, the place falls again under the consideration of Grotius in those Annotations on the Revelation; which, as the apologist tells us, “received their very lineaments and colors from his own pencil.” There, then, he gives us this account thereof: “ Kai< lou>santi hJma~v ajpo< tw~n aJmartiw~n hJmw~n ejn tw~| ai[mati auJtou~. Sanguine suo, id est, morte tolerata, certos nos reddidit veriatis eorum quae docuerat, quae talia sunt, ut nihil sit aptius ad purgandos a vitiis animos. Humidae naturae, sub qua est et sanguis, proprium est lavare. Id vero per egregiam ajllhgori>an ad animam transfertur. Dicitur autem Christus suo sanguine nos lavasse, quia et ipse omnia praestitit quae ad id requirebantur et apparet secutum in plurimis effectum.” I desire the apologist to tell me what he thinks of this piece, thus perfected, with all its lineaments and colors, by the pencil of that skillful man, and what beautiful aspect he supposeth it to have. Let the reader, to prevent farther trouble in perusing transcriptions of this kind, consider Revelation 13:8, p. 114; Hebrews 9:25to the end, which he calls “an illustrious place,” in the same page and forward; 1 John 2:2, p. 140; Romans 5:10,11, p. 142, 143; Ephesians 2:16, p. 148, 149; Colossians 1:20-22, Titus 2:14, p. 156; Hebrews 9:14,15, p. 157, 158; Acts 20:28, and many others, and compare them with the annotations on those places, and he will be farther enabled to judge of the defense made of the one by the instance of the other. I shall only desire that he who undertakes to give his judgment of this whole matter be somewhat acquainted with the state of the difference about this point of the doctrine of the gospel between the Socinians and us; that he do not take “auferre peccata” to be “ferre peccata;” “nostri causa” to be “nostra vice” and “nostro loco;” causa prohgoume>nh to be prokatarktikh>; “liberatio a jugo peccati” to be “redemptio a reatu peccati;” “subire poenas simpliciter” to be “subire poenas nobis debitas;” to be lu>tron ,” and µv;a; , in respect of the event, to be so as to the proper nature of the thing; “offerre seipsum in coelo,” to be as much as “offerre seipsum in cruce, ” as to the work itself; that so he be not mistaken to think that when the first are granted the latter are so also. For a close of the discourse relating to this head, a brief account may be added why I said not positively that he had wrested all the places of Scripture giving testimony to the satisfaction of Christ to another sense, but that he had either done so or else concealed or obscured that sense in them.

  Though I might give instances from one or two places in his Annotations on the Gospels giving occasion to this assertion, yet I shall insist only on some taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews, where is the great and eminent seat of the doctrine of Christ’s satisfaction. Although in his annotations on that epistle he doth openly corrupt the most clear testimonies given to this truth, yet there are some passages in them wherein he seems to dissent from the Socinians. In his annotations on chap. 5:5 he hath these words: “Jesus sacerdotale quidem munus suum aliquo modo erat auspicatus; cum semet patri victimam offerret.” That Christ was a priest when he was on the earth was wholly denied by Socinus, both in his book De Servatore, and in his epistle to Niemojevius, as I have showed elsewhere. Smalcius seems to be of the same judgment in the Racovian Catechism. Grotius says, “Sacerdotale munus erat aliquo modo auspicatus;” yet herein he goes not beyond Crel-lius, who tells us, “Mortem Christus subiit duplici ratione, partim quidem ut foederis mediator seu sponsor, partim quidem ut sacerdos Deo ipsum oblaturus,” De Caua Mort. Christi, p. 6. And so Volkelius fully to the same purpose. “Partes, ” saith he, “muneris sacerdotis, haec sunt potissimum; mactatio victimae, in tabernaculum ad oblationem peragendam ingressio, et ex eodem egressio: ac mactatio quidem mortem Christi, violentam sanguinis profusionem con-tinct,” De Relig. lib. 3 cap. 47, p. 145. And again: “Hinc colligitur solam Christi mortem nequaquam illam perfectam absolutamque ipsius oblationem (de qua in Epistola ad Hebraeos agitur) fuisse, sed principium et praeparationem quandam ipsius sacerdotii in coelo demum administrandi extitisse,” ibid. So that nothing is obtained by Grotius’ “Munus sacerdotale aliquo modo erat auspicatus,” but what is granted by Crellius and Volkeliua But in the next words, “Cum semet offerret patri victimam,” he seems to leave them: but he seems only so to do; for Volkelius acknowledgeth that he did slay the sacrifice in his death, though that was not his complete and perfect oblation, which is also afterward affirmed by Grotius, and Crellius expressly affirms the same. Nor doth he seem to intend a proper expiatory and satisfactory sacrifice in that expression; for if he had, he would not have been guilty of such an ajkurologi>a as to say, “Semet obtulit patri.” Besides, though he doth acknowledge elsewhere that this “victima” was µv;a; , and uJpesacrifice for sin. And, which is yet worse, on chap. 9:14 he gives us such an account why expiation is ascribed to the blood of Christ, as is a key to his whole interpretation of that epistle. “Sanguini ,” saith he, “pur-gatio ista tribuitur, quia per sanguinem, id est, mortem Christi, secuta ejus excitatione et evectione, giguitur in nobis fides, quae deinde fides corda purgat. ” And, therefore, where Christ is said to offer himself by the eternal Spirit, he tells us, “Oblatio Christi hic intelligitur illa, quae oblationi legali in adyto factae respondet, ea autem est, non oblatio in altari crucis facta, sed facta in adyto coelesti.” So that the purgation of sin is an effect of Christ’s presenting himself in heaven only; which how well it agrees with what the apostle says, chap. 1:3, the reader will easily judge. And to manifest that this was his constant sense, on these words, verse 26, Eijv ajqe>thsin aJmarti>av dia< th~v qusi>av auJtou~, he thus comments: “ Eijv ajqe>thsin aJmarti>av.

  Ut peccatum in nobis extingueretur; fit autem hoc per passionem Christi, quae fidem nobis ingenerat, quae corda purificat.” Christ confirming his doctrine by his death, begets faith in us, which doth the work. Of the 28th verse of the same chapter I have spoken before. The same he affirms again more expressly on chap. 10:3; and verses 9, 12, he interprets the oblation of Christ, whereby he took away sin, to be the oblation or offering of himself in heaven, whereby sin is taken away by sanctification, as also in sundry other places where the expiatory sacrifice of Christ on earth, and the taking away of the guilt of sin by satisfaction, are evidently intended.

  So that notwithstanding the concession mentioned, I cannot see the least reason to alter my thoughts of the Annotations as to this business on hand.

  Not farther to abound in causa facili, in all the differences we have with the Socinians about Christ’s dying for us, concerning the nature of redemption, reconciliation, mediation, sacrifice, the meaning of all the phrases and expressions in which these things are delivered to us, the annotator is generally on the apostate side throughout his Annotations; and the truth is, I know no reason why our students should with so much diligence and charge labor to get into their hands the books of Socinus, Crellius, Smalcius, and the rest of that crew, seeing these Annotations, as to the most important heads of Christian religion, about the deity, sacrifice, priesthood, and satisfaction of Christ, original sin, free will, justification, etc, afford them the substance and marrow of what is spoken by them; so that as to these heads, upon the matter, there is nothing peculiar to the annotator but the secular learning which in his interpretations he hath curiously and gallantly interweaved. Plautus makes sport, in his Amphitryo, with several persons, some real, some assumed, of such likeness one to another that they could not discern themselves by any outward appearance; which caused various contests and mistakes between them. The poet’s fancy raised not a greater similitude between Mercury and Sosia, being supposed to be different persons, than there is a dissimilitude between the author of the book De Satisfactione Christi and of the Annotations concerning which we have been discoursing, being one and the same. Nor was the contest of those different persons, so like one another, so irreconcilable as are these of this single person, so unlike himself in the several treatises mentioned. And I cannot but think it strange that the apologist could imagine no surer measure to be taken of Grotius’ meaning in his Annotations than his treatise of the Satisfaction of Christ doth afford, there being no two treatises that I know, of any different persons whatever, about one and the same subject, that are more at variance. Whether now any will be persuaded by the apologist to believe that Grotius was constant in his Annotations to the doctrine delivered in that other treatise I am not solicitous.

  For the re-enforced plea of the apologist, that these Annotations were not finished by him, but only collections, that he might after dispose of, I am not concerned in it, having to deal with that book of Annotations that goes under his name. If they are none of his, it is neither on the one hand nor other of any concernment unto me. I say not this as though the apologist had in the least made good his former plea by his new exceptions to my evidence against it, from the printer’s preface to the volume of Annotations on the Epistles. He says, “What was the opus integrum that was commended to the care of oJ dei~na ?” and answers himself, “Not that last pats or volume of Annotations, but opus integrum, the whole volume or volumes that contained his ajne>kdota adversaria on the New Testament.” For how ill this agrees with the intention and words of the prefacer, a slight inspection will suffice to manifest. He tells us that Grotius had himself published his Annotations on the Gospels five years before; that at his departure from Paris, he left a great part of thin volume (that is this on the Acts and Epistles) with a friend; that the reason why he left not opus integrum, that is, the whole volume, with him was because the residue of it was not so written as that an amanuensis could well understand it; that, therefore, in his going towards Sweden, he wrote that part again with his own hand, and sent it back to the same person (that had the former part of the volume committed to him) from Hamburg. If the apologist read this preface, he ought, as I suppose, to have desisted from the plea insisted on. If he did not, he thought assuredly he had much reason to despise them with whom he had to do. But, as I said, herein am I not concerned.

  The consideration of the charge on the Annotations relating to their tampering with the testimonies given in the Scripture to THE DEITY OF CHRIST, being another head of the whole, may now have place.

  The sum of what is to this purpose by me affirmed is, that in the Annotations on the Old and New Testament, Grotius hath left but one place giving testimony clearly to the deity of Christ, To this assertion I added both a limitation and also an enlargement in several respects; — a limitation, that I could not perceive he had spoken of himself clearly on that one place. On supposition that he did so, I granted that perhaps one or two places more might accordingly be interpreted. That this one place is John 1:1, I expressly affirmed; that is the one place wherein, as I say, he spake not home to the business. The defense of the apologist in the behalf of Grotius consists of sundry discourses: — First, To disprove that he hath [not] left more than that one of John free from the corruption charged, he instances in that one of John 1:1, wherein, as he saith, he expressly asserts the deity of Christ; but yet wisely foreseeing that this instance would not evade the charge, having been expressly excepted (as to the present inquiry) and reserved to farther debate, he adds the places quoted by Grotius in the exposition of that place, as Proverbs 8:21-27, Isaiah, 45:12, 48:13, 2 Peter 3:5, Colossians 1:16: from all which he concludes that the Annotations have left more testimonies to the deity of Christ untampered withal and unperverted than my assertion will allow, reckoning them all up again, section the 10th, and concluding himself a successful advocate in this case, or at least under a despair of ever being so in any if he acquit not himself clearly in this. If his failure herein be evinced by the course of his late writings, himself will appear to be most concerned. I suppose, then, that on the view of this defense, men must needs suppose that in the annotations on the places repeated, and mustered a second time by the apologist, Grotius does give their sense as bearing witness to the deity of Christ. Others may be pleased to take it for granted without farther consideration; for my part, being a little concerned to inquire, I shall take the pains to turn to the places, and give the reader a brief account of them.

  For Proverbs 8, his first note on the wisdom there spoken of is, “Haec de ea sapientia quae in Lege apparet exponunt Hebraei: et sane el, si non soli, at praecipue haec attributa conveniunt.” Now, if the attributes here mentioned agree either solely or principally to the wisdom that shines in the law, how they can be the attributes of the person of the eternal Son of God I see not. He adds no more to that purpose until he comes to the 22d verse, the verse of old contested about with the Arians. His words on that are, “Graecum Aquilae est, ejkth>sato> me , ut et Symmachi et Theodotionis, respondetque bene Hebraeo ynin;q; . At Chaldaeus habet ar;B] , et LXX. e]ktise , sensu non malo, si creare sumas pro facere ut apparent.

  Viae Dei sunt operationes ipsius. Sensum hujus loci et sequentium non male exprimas cum Philone de Coloniis: O lo>gov oJ presbu>terov tw~n ge>nesin eijlhfo>twn ou+ kaqa>per oi]akov ejneilhme>nov oJ tw~n o[lwn kubernh>thv phdalioucei~ ta< su>mpanta kai< o[te ejkosmopla>stei crhsa>menov ojrga>nw| tou>tw| protion tw~n ajpoteloume>nwn su>stasin. ” On verse 27 he adds, “Aderam, id est, h=n pron , ut infra Johan. Evang. 1:1.’

  What clear and evident testimony, by this exposition, is left in this place to the deity of Christ, I profess myself as ignorant as I was before I received this direction by the apologist. He tells us that ynin;q; is rendered not amiss by the Chaldee ar;B] , and the LXX. e]ktise , though he knew that sense was pleaded by the Arians, and exploded by the ancient doctors of the church. To relieve this concession, he tells us that “creare” may be taken for “facere ut appareat,” though there be no evidence of such a use of the word in Scripture, nor can he give any instance thereof. The whole interpretation runs on that wisdom that is a property of God, which he manifested in the works of creation. Of the Son of God, the essential Wisdom of God, subsisting with the Father, we have not one word. Nor doth that quotation out of Philo relieve us in this business at all; we know in what sense he used the word oJ lo>gov . How far he and the Platonics, with whom in this expression he consented, were from understanding the only-begotten Son of God, is known. If this of Philo has any aspect towards the opinion of any professing themselves Christians, it is towards that of the Arians, which seems to be expressed therein And this is the place chosen by the apologist to disprove the assertion of none being left, under the sense given them by the Annotations, beating clear testimony to the deity of Christ! His comparing ynia; µv; , “ibi ego,” which the Vulgar renders “aderam, ” with h=n pron , seems rather to cast a suspicion on his intention in the expression of that place of the evangelist than in the least to give testimony to the deity of Christ in thin If any one be farther desirous to be satisfied how many clear, unquestionable evidences of the deity of Christ are slighted by these annotations on this chapter, let him consult my vindication of the place in my late “Vindiciae Evangelicae,” where he will find something tendered to him to that purpose. What the apologist intended by adding these two places of Isaiah, chap. 45:12 and chap. 48:13 (when in his annotations on these places Grotius not once mentions the deity of Christ, nor any thing of him, nor hath occasion so to do, nor doth produce them in this place to any such end or purpose, but only to show that the Chaldee paraphrase doth sundry times, when things are said to be done by God, render it that they were done by the word of God), as instances to the prejudice of my assertion, I cannot imagine.

  On that of Peter, 2 Epist. 3:5, Tw~| tou~ Qeou~ lo>gw| , he adds, indeed, “Vide quae diximus ad initium Evangelii Johannis;” but neither doth that place intend the natural Son of God, nor is it so interpreted by Grotius.

  To these he adds, in the close, Colossians 1:16, in the exposition whereof in his Annotations he expressly prevaricates, and goes off to the interpretation insisted on by Socinus and his companions; which the apologist well knew.

  Without farther search upon what hath been spoken, the apologist gives in his verdict concerning the falseness of my assertion before mentioned, of the annotator’s speaking clear and home to the deity of Christ but in one, if in one, place of his Annotations. But, — 1. What one other place hath he produced whereby the contrary to what I assert is evinced? Any man may make apologies at this rate as fast as he pleases. 2. As to his not speaking clearly in that one, notwithstanding the improvement made of his expressions by the apologist, I am still of the same mind as formerly; for although he ascribes an eternity tw~| lo>gw| , and affirms all things to be made thereby, yet, considering how careful he is of ascribing an uJpo>stasiv tw~| lo>gw|, how many Platonic interpretations of that expression he interweaves in his expositions, how he hath darkened the whole counsel of God in that place about the subsistence of the Word, his omnipotency and incarnation, so clearly asserted by the Holy Ghost therein, I see no tea-son to retract the assertion opposed. But yet as to the thing itself, about this place I will not contend: only, it may not be amiss to observe, that not only the Arians, but even Photinus himself, acknowledged that the world was made tw~| Qeou~ lo>gw| , [so] that how little is obtained towards the confirmation of the deity of Christ by that concession may be discerned.

  I shall offer also only at present, that; oJ lo>gov tou~ Qeou~ is threefold, — lo>gov uJpostatiko>v ejndia>qetov, and proforiko>v . The lo>gov uJpostatiko>v or oujsiw>dhv is Christ, mentioned John 1:1, his personal and eternal subsistence, with his omnipotency, being there asserted.

  Whether Christ be so called anywhere else in the New Testament may be disputed; Luke 1:2 compared with 1 John 1:1, 2 Peter 1:19, Acts 20:32, Hebrews 4:12, are the most likely to give us that use of the word.

  Why Christ is so termed I have showed elsewhere. That he is called rb;D; , Psalm 33:6, is to me also evident, hL;mi is better rendered rJh~ma or le>xiv than lo>gov . Where that word is used, it denotes not Christ, though Samuel 23:2, where that word is, is urged by some to that purpose. He is also called rb;D; , Haggai 2:5; so perhaps in other places. Our present Quakers would have that expression of the “word of God,” used nowhere in any other sense; so that destroying that, as they do, in the issue they may freely despise the Scripture, as that which they say is not the word of God, nor anywhere so called. Lo>gov ejndia>qetov amongst men is that which Aristotle calls togon. Lo>gov ejn nw~| lambano>menov , says Hesychiua Lo>gov ejndia>qetov is that which we speak in our hearts, says Damascen. De Orthod. Fid. lib. 1 cap 18: so Psalm 14:1, /BliB] lb;n; rmæa; . This, as spoken in respect of God, is that egress of his power whereby, according to the eternal conception of his mind, he worketh any thing: so Genesis 1:2, “God said, Let there be light; and there was light.”

  Of this word of God the psalmist treats, <19D701> Psalm 137:18, “He sendeth out /rb;D] , and melteth the ice;” and <19E808> Psalm 148:8 the same word is used; — in both which places the LXX. render it by oJ lo>gov . This is that which is called rJh~ma th~v duna>mewv , Hebrews 1:3, Hebrews 11:3, where the apostle says, “The heavens were made rJh>mati Qeou~ :” which is directly parallel to that place of 2 Peter 3:5, where it is expressed tw~| tou~ Qeou~ lo>gw| ; for though rJh~ma more properly denotes lo>gon proforiko>n, yet in these places it signifies plainly that egress of God’s power for the production and preservation of things, being a pursuit of the eternal conception of his mind, which is lo>gov ejndia>qetov. Now, this infinitely wise and eternal conception of the mind of God exerting itself in power, wherein God is said to speak (“He said, Let there be light”), is that which the Platonics, and Philo with them, harped on, never once dreaming of a co-essential and hypostatical Word of God, though the word uJpo>stasiv occurs amongst them. This they thought was unto God, as in us, lo>gov ejndia>qetov or oJ e]sw pro< th~v dianoi>av eujrunome>nh , De Agric. That this was his oJ lo>gov is most evident. Hence he tells us, Oujdesmon h\ oJ tou~ ajrcite>ktonov logismolin kti>zein dianoume>nou. Mwse>wv ga< do>gma tou~to oujk ejmo>n , De Mund. Opific. And a little after, To< ajo>raton kai< nohtogon eijko>na le>gei Qeou~ kai< tau>yhv eijko>na togou~ ge>gonen eijkwsantov thnesin aujtou~ kai< e]stin uJperoura>niov ajsth>r The whole tendency of his discourse is, that the word of God, in his mind, in the erection of the world, was the image of himself, and that the idea or image of the things to be made, but especially of light. And whereas (if I remember aright, for I cannot now find the place) I have said somewhere that Christ was lo>gov ejndia>qetov , though therein I have the consent of very many learned divines, and used it merely in opposition tw~| proforikw~, yet I desire to recall it; nor do I think there is any propriety in that expression of e]mfutov used of Christ, but only in those of uJpostatiko>v and oujsiw>dhv, which the Scripture (though not in the very terms) will make good. In this second acceptation, tou~ lo>gou , Photinus himself granted that the world was made by the word of God. Now, if it be thought necessary that I should give an account of my fear that nothing but oJ lo>gov in this sense, decked with many Platonical encomiums, was intended in the Annotations on John 1 (though I confess much, from some quotations there used, may be said against it), I shall readily undertake the task; but at present, in this running course, I shall add no more.

  But now, as if all the matter in hand were fully despatched, we have this triumphant close attending the former discourse and observations: — “If one text acknowledged to assert Christ’s eternal divinity” (which one was granted to do it, though not clearly) “will not suffice to conclude him no Socinian” (which I said not he was, yea, expressly waived the management of any such charge); “if six verses in the Proverbs, two in Isaiah, one in St Peter, one in St Paul, added to many in the beginning of St John” (in his annotations on all which he speaks not one word to the purpose), “will not yet amount to above one text; or, lastly, if that one may be doubted of also which is by him interpreted to affirm Christ’s eternal subsistence with God before the creation of the world” (which he doth not so interpret as to a personal subsistence), “and that the whole world was created by him, — I shall despair of ever being a successful advocate for any man:” from which condition I hope some little time will recover the apologist.

  This is the sum of what is pleaded in chief for the defense of the Annotations; wherein what small cause he hath to acquiesce who hath been put to the labor and trouble of vindicating near forty texts of Scripture, in the Old Testament and New, giving express testimony to the deity of Christ, from the annotator’s perverse interpretations, let the reader judge.

  In the 13th section of the apologist’s discourse, he adds some other considerations to confirm his former vindication of the Annotations.

  He tells us that he “professeth not to divine what places of the Old Testament, wherein the deity of Christ is evidently testified unto, are corrupted by the learned man; nor will he, upon the discouragement already received, make any inquiry into my treatise.” But what need of divination? The apologist cannot but remember at all times some of the texts of the Old Testament that are pleaded to that purpose; and he hath at least as many encouragements to look into the Annotations as discouragements from casting an eye upon that volume, as he calls it, wherein they are called to an account. And if he suppose he can make a just defense for the several places so wrested and Perverted without once consulting them, I know not how by me he might possibly be engaged into such an inquiry; and therefore I shall not name them again, having done somewhat more than name them already.

  But he hath two suppletory considerations that will render any such inquiry or inspection needless. Of these the first is, — “That the word of God being all and every part of it of equal truth, that doctrine which is founded on five places of divine writ must by all Christians be acknowledged to be as irrefragably confirmed as a hundred express places would be conceived to confirm it.”

  Ans. It is confessed that not only five, but any one express text of Scripture, is sufficient for the confirmation of any divine truth; but that five places have been produced out of the Annotations by the apologist, for the confirmation of the great truth pleaded about, is but pretended, — indeed there is no such thing. The charge on Grotius was, that he had depraved all but one. If that be no crime, the defense was at hand; if it be, though that one should be acknowledged to be clear to that purpose, here is no defense against that which was charged, but a strife about that which was not. Let the places be consulted: if the assertion prove true by an induction of instances, the crime is to be confessed, or else the charge denied to contain a crime. But, secondly, he says, — “That this charge, upon inquiry, will be found in some degree, if not equally, chargeable on the learnedest and most valuable of the first reformers, particularly upon Mr Calvin himself, who hath been as bitterly and unjustly accused and reviled upon this account (witness the book intitled ‘Calvino Turcismus’) as ever Erasmus was by Bellarmine and Beza, or as probably Grotius may be.”

  Though this, at the best, be but a diversion of the charge, and no defense, yet, not containing that truth which is needful to countenance it for the end for which it is proposed, I could not pass it by. It is denied (which in this case, until farther proof, must suffice) that any of the learnedst of the first reformers, and particularly Mr Calvin, are equally chargeable, or in any degree of proportion, with Grotius, as to the crime insisted on. Calvin being the man instanced in, I desire the apologist to prove that he hath, in all his commentaries on the Scripture, corrupted the sense of any text of the Old Testament or New giving express testimony to the deity of Christ, and commonly pleaded to that end and purpose; although I deny not but that he differs from the common judgment of most in the interpretation of some few prophetical passages judged by them to relate to Christ. I know what Genebrard and some others of that faction raved against him; but it was chiefly from some expressions in his Institutes about the Trinity (wherein yet he is acquitted by the most learned of themselves), and not from his expositions of Scripture, from which they raised their clamors.

  For the book called “Calvino Turcismus,” written by Reynolds and Giffard, the apologist has forgotten the design of it. Calvin is no more concerned in it than others of the first reformers; nor is it from any doctrine about the deity of Christ in particular, but from the whole of the reformed religion, with the apostasies of some of that profession, that they compare it with Turcism. Something, indeed, in a chapter or two, they speak about the Trinity, from some expressions of Luther, Me-lancthon, Calvin, and others; but as to Calvin’s expositions of Scripture, they insist not on them. Possibly the apologist may have seen Paraeus’ “Calvinus Orthodoxus,” in answer to Hunnius’ “Calvinus Judaizans;” if not, he may at any time have there an account of this calumny.

  Having passed through the consideration of the two considerable heads of this discourse, in the method called for by the apologist (having only taken liberty to transpose them as to first and last), I must profess myself as yet unsatisfied as to the necessity or suitableness of this kind of defense. The sum of that which I affirmed (which alone gives occasion to the defensative now under consideration) is, that, to my observation, Grotius in his Annotations had not left above one text of Scripture, if one, giving clear evidence to the deity of Christ. Of his satisfaction I said in sum the same thing. Had the apologist been pleased to have produced instances of any evidence for the disprovement of my assertion, I should very gladly and readily have acknowledged my mistake and oversight. I am still, also, in the same resolution as to the latitude of the expression, though I have already, by an induction of particulars, manifested his corrupting and perverting of so many, both in respect of the one head and of the other, with his express compliance with the Socinians in his so doing, as that I cannot have the least thought of letting fall my charge, which, with the limitation expressed (of my own observation), contains the truth in this matter, and nothing but that which is so.

  It was, indeed, in my thoughts to have done somewhat more in reference to those Annotations than thus occasionally to have animadverted on their corruption in general, — namely, to have proceeded in the vindication of the truths of the gospel from their captivity under the false glosses put upon them by the interpretations of places of Scripture wherein they are delivered. But this work being fallen on an abler hand, namely, that of our learned professor of divinity, my desire is satisfied, and the necessity of my endeavor for that end removed.

  There are sundry other particulars insisted on by the apologist, and a great deal of rhetoric is laid out about them; which certainly deserve not the reader’s trouble in the perusal of any other debate about them. If they did, it were an easy matter to discover his mistakes in them all along. The foundation of most of them lies in that which he affirms, sect. 4, where he says that “I thus state the jealousies about H. G. as far as it is owned by me, namely, that being in doctrine a Socinian, he yet closed in many things with the Roman interest:” to which he replies, that “this does not so much as pretend that he was a Papist;” as though I undertake to prove Grotius to be a Papist, or did not expressly disown the management of the jealousy stated as above, or that I did at all own it, all which are otherwise.

  Yet I shall now say, whether he was in doctrine a Socinian or no let his Annotations before insisted on determine; and whether he closed with the Roman interest or no, besides what hath been observed by others, I desire the apologist to consider his observation on Revelation 12:5, that book (himself being judge) having received his last hand. But my business is not to accuse Grotius, or to charge his memory with any thing but his prevarication in his Annotations on the Scripture. f499 And as I shall not cease to press the general aphorism, as it is called, That no drunkard, etc., nor any person whatever not born of God, or united to Christ, the head, by the same Spirit that is in him, and in the sense thereof perfecting holiness in the fear of God, shall ever see his face in glory, so I fear not what conclusion can regularly, in reference to any person living or dead, be thence deduced.

  It is the Annotations whereof I have spoken, which I have my liberty to do, and I presume shall still continue, whilst I live in the same thoughts of them, though I should see, — a third defense of the learned Hugo Grotius.

  The Epistles of Grotius to Crellius mentioned by the apologist in his first defense of him, giving some light to what hath been insisted on, I thought it not unfit to communicate them to the reader as they came to my hand, having not as yet been printed, that I know of: — Reverendo summaeque eruditionis ac pietatis viro, Domino Johanni Crellio, pastori Racov. H. G. S.

  Libro tuo quo ad eum quem ego quondam scripseram (eruditissime Crelli) respondisti, adeo offensus non fui, ut etiam gratias tunc intra animum meum egerim, nunc et hisce agam literis. Primo, quod non tantum humane, sed et valde officiose mecum egeris, ita ut queri nihil possim, nisi quod in me praediando, modum interdum excedis, deinde vero, quod multa me docueris, partita utilia, partim jucunda scitu, meque exemplo tuo incitaveris ad penitius expenden. dum sensus sacrorum librorum. Bene autem in epistola tua quae mihi longe gratissima advenit, de me judicas, non esse me eorum in numero qui ob sententias saiva pietate dissidentes alieno a quoquam sim animo, aut boni alicuius amicitiam repudiem. Equidem in libro “De Vera Religione,” quem jam percurri, relecturus et posthac, multa invenio summo cum judicio observats. Illud vero saeculo gratulor, repertos homines qui neutiquam in controversiis subtilibus tantum ponunt quantum in vera vitae emendatione, et quotidiano ad sanctitatem profectu.

  Utinam et mea scripta aliquid ad hoc studium in animis hominum excitandum in-flammandumque conferre possint: tunc enim non frustra me vixisse hactenus existimem. Liber “De Veritate Religionis Christianae” magis ut nobis esset solatio, quam ut aliis documento scriptus, non video quid post tot aliorum labores utilitatis afferre possit, nisi ipsa forte brevitate. Siquid tamen in eo est, quod tibi tuique similibus placeat, mihi supra evenit. Libris “De Jure Belli et Pacis” mihi praecipue propositum habui, ut feritatem illam, non Christianis tantum, seal et hominibus indignam, ad bella pro libitu suscipienda, pro libitu gerenda, quam gliscere tot populorum malo quotidie video, quantum in me est, sedarem. Gaudeo ad principum quorundam manus eos libros venisse, qui utinam partem eorum meliorem in suum animum admitterent. Nullus enim mihi ex eo labore suavior fructus eontingere possit. Te vero quod attinet, credas, rogo, si quid unquam facere possim tui, aut eorum quos singulariter arnas, causa, experturum to, quantum to tuo merito faeiam. Nunc quum aliud possim nihil, Dominum Jesum sup-plice animo veneror, ut tibl aliisque, pietatem promoventibus propitius adsit.

  Tui nominis studiosissimus, 10 Maii. M.DC.XXVI. H.G. —— Tam pro epistola (vir clarissime) quam pro transmisso libro, gratias ago maximas. Constitui et legere et relegere diligenter quaecunque a to proficiscuntur, expertus quo cum fructu id antehae fecerim. Eo ipso tempore quo literas tuas accepi, versabar in lectione tuae interpretationis in Epistolam ad Galatas. Quantum judicare possum et scripti occasionem et propositum, et totam seriem dictionis, ut magna cum cura indagasti, ita feliciter admodum es assequutus. Quare Deum precor, ut et tibi et tui similibus vitam det, et quae alia ad istiusmodi labores necessaria. Mihi ad juvandam communem Christianismi causam, utinam tam adessent vires, quam promptus est animus: quippe me, a prima aerate, per varia disciplinarum genera jactatum, nulla res magis delectavit quam rerum sacrarum meditatio. Id in rebus prosperis moderamen, id in adversis solamen sensi. Pacis consilia et amavi semper et amo nunc quoque; eoque doleo, quum video, tam pertinacibus iris committi inter se eos, qui Christi se esse dicunt. Si recte rem putamus, quantillis de causis